Moldovan wheat market research by -
 
 
  Center  
for Strategic Studies       
and Reforms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moldovan Wheat Market Research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Creation of the wheat market: production, consumption, export/import, 
prices 
• Situation in 2003: wheat failure, state regulation measures 
• Competitive environment, prices and territorial aspects of the problem 
• Conclusions and recommendations. Database 
 
 
 
The initiative of this research belongs to the Food Security Programme, European 
Commission (EC FSP-Moldova) 
 
This document has been prepared and published by the CISR. Material may be quoted 
with proper attribution. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this 
paper are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed in any manner to the 
EC Food Security Programme Moldova, EC Food Security Programme, European 
Commission, or any affiliated organizations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chisinau, January 2004
 
CONTENTS 
 
 
 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 3 
 
1. Pre-market period practices and lessons.................................................................. 4 
 
1.1. Grain Production in 80 – 90s: Volumes, Crop Capacity, Quality ......................... 4 
1.2. Forms and methods of state administration of grain sector under the planned 
system  and during privatization period ................................................................. 6 
 
2. Wheat market development during the transitional period................................. 10 
 
2.1. Legal basis for the grain market regulation ......................................................... 10 
2.2. Transformation of the grain production sector: economic agents, land tenure, 
results ................................................................................................................... 12 
2.3. Wheat utilization: consumption, state reserves, export and import..................... 17 
 
3. 2003: Wheat Failure, Bread Crisis Danger............................................................ 22 
 
3.1. Main trends on world and regional wheat markets.............................................. 22 
3.2. 2003: Wheat Production, Utilization Balance, Demand...................................... 24 
3.3. State regulation measures in the wheat, flour and bread markets ....................... 26 
3.4. Dynamics and problems of wheat import............................................................ 29 
3.5. Competitive Environment and Prices on the Bread Market ................................ 31 
 
4. Territorial Aspects of “Bread Problem” ................................................................ 34 
 
4.1. Chisinau: JSC “Franzelutsa” as a leader on the bread market............................. 34 
4.2. Regional situation: Rural Area ............................................................................ 37 
4.3. Measures launched by administration of Transnistria......................................... 39 
 
5. Bread prices shocks and the poor ........................................................................... 43 
 
Conclusions and recommendations............................................................................. 47 
 
References ..................................................................................................................... 52 
 
Introduction 
 
The problem. After a rather long period of time when Republic of Moldova had been 
producing circa 1.0 million tons of wheat (on average per year – 1062.2 thousand tons 
in 1991-1995 and 951.8 thousand tons in 1996-2002), the current year happened to be 
an extremely unfortunate for this crop. The cause is unfavorable climate conditions of 
the 2002/2003 winter (hard frost and lack of snow on fields) resulting in that most fields 
under winter crops were re-sowed in the spring with corn and sunflower. And after that 
the spring and summer drought was occurred. The bread wheat gross yield for 2003 is 
estimated at 101.5 thousand tons or 3 times as low as county’s need for it. The necessity 
to import wheat in extremely great volumes emerged, as well as to use available (from 
the previous year) reserves efficiently. A similar situation has developed in most 
European countries, including the neighboring countries – Romania and Ukraine. Since 
the mid-2003 prices for wheat and flour on the world’s market started to grow quickly. 
 
And finally, beginning from November all this resulted inevitably in sharp increase of 
prices for flour and bread in Moldova, thus affecting the poor strata of the population 
first of all. In addition to the corresponding reaction of the market and economic agents, 
actions of the Parliament and Government followed related to state regulation of the 
situation – through import stimulation, taxation, price control, etc. 
 
The aim of the present report is a complex assessment of the situation on Moldovan 
wheat market as regards both quantity indicators (production, reserves, export/import, 
prices) and quality characteristics – administrative and legislative state measures, 
market transformation of the grain production and distribution sector, territorial aspects 
of the “bread issue”, competitive environment on the markets of wheat, flour and bread. 
Besides the Analytical report on the problem, a task was set to prepare a comprehensive 
Database and organize a Workshop with participation of state bodies’ and NGOs’ 
representatives to approve results of the research. 
 
The research was initiated by the European Commission Food Security Programme in 
Moldova (Programme coordinator – David Johnson, expert – Michael Peleah). The 
executor is a nongovernmental organization, Center for Strategic Studies and Reforms 
(CISR); the working group consisting of Gudim Anatol, Kutyrkin Vladislav, Ostritschi 
Galina, Ciobu Stela and Shelari Galina. 
 
The data used: Department of Statistics and Sociology, Ministry of Economy, Ministry 
of Agriculture and Food Industry, Customs Department, JSC “Franzeluţa”, 
administration of Transnistria and results of the PFAP/CISR sociological research held 
in 302 rural settlements of 32 country’s raions and ATU Gagauzia. 
 
The research was realized during November 2003 – January 2004 
 
 
1. Pre-market period practices and lessons 
 
Moldova has been famous for fertility of its land from the earliest times and agriculture 
has been traditionally the basis of the country’s economy and prosperity. The people 
expressed this reality through an old proverb „Opincă-i talpa ţării” („Opinca – ancient 
peasant shoes – is the prop of the country). And Dmitry Cantemir, a Moldovan ruler and 
philosopher, wrote at the beginning of the 18th century: “Moldavia’s fields, which 
exceptional fertility ancient and later authors have mentioned, by far excels the riches of 
the mountains…”1. 
 
Afterwards, in 19-20 centuries food, including grain became one of the main export 
articles of Moldova, while majority of its towns emerged and developed along trade 
routes and places of trade fairs. In 70-80’s of the 20th century Moldova’s agriculture was 
characterized by an extremely high concentration and intensity of production. Food 
production per capita in MSSR was almost twice as much as average level of the USSR, 
while as regards 100 ha of agricultural land – by a factor of 4.1. 
As regards annual agricultural production Moldova’s during the 80’s was the 6th among 
the Soviet republics, inferior only to such territorial giants as Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan2. Most intersectoral structures of the country’s agro-
industrial complex (viticulture-winemaking, fruits, vegetables-conserves, sugar, 
sunflower-seed oil, tobacco, etc.) were oriented to export and the only sub-complex 
oriented mainly to the internal country’s consumption, including needs of stock-raising, 
was production of grain and its derivatives. 
 
1.1. Grain Production in 80 – 90’s: Volumes, Crop Capacity, Quality 
 
Traditional grain-crops (wheat, maize, barley, ray and oats) always covered the greatest 
part of Moldova plough-land. The highest concentration of grain production is situated 
in the North of the country (Balti steppe) and in the South – in Budjac. In the planned 
economy, according to scientifically valid standards of land use the share of grain crops 
made up 52 – 55% of the total area of field crops. As sectoral structure of crop 
production became more complicated (with an increase of areas of vineyard, orchard 
and industrial crops) the grain crops areas reduced: in 1940 – 1672.2 thou ha, in 1960 – 
822.3 thou ha., in 1970 – 831.5 thou ha., in 1980 – 842.2 thou ha and in 1990 – 745.7 
thou ha; wheat yield increased from 7-8 centner/ha in 1940 to 30 centner/ha in the 80’s. 
In Moldova in 60-80s, average annual production volume of grain stabilized at 1600-
2700 thousand tons, including 700-1000 thousand tons of wheat.  
 
Under the conditions of planned economy of Moldova before 1990 principal parameters 
applied for use of bread wheat were the following: domestic demand for population 
needs (bread) – 400.0 thousand tons, seed-stock – 100-110 thousand tons, annually 
renewed government reserve – 30.0-50.0 thousand tons. Production proportion of bread 
wheat and a lower quality fodder grain in the 80’s was 40:60. Main requirements of 
wheat for bread-making were: content of gluten – minimum 18%, humidity – 
maximum13.5%, gluten deformation index (GDI) – 20-100 standard units, germinated 
grains – maximum 3%, percentage of cereal impurities – maximum 2%. 
                                                 
  Дмитрий Кантемир «Описание Молдовы», Картя Молдовеняскэ, 1973, с. 34 
2 Anuarul statistic al Republicii Moldova – 1994, DSS, Chişinău, 1995 
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In Moldova in 80’s consumption of bread and bread products (macaroni, cereals etc.) 
was 172-174 kg per capita that made up 5.0-5.6% in the structure of cash expenditures 
of households. Prices for bread were underestimated artificially. 
 
In 80’s there were not large-scale export-import operations in the field of bread wheat; 
the republic mainly supplied maize (including for seeds) to All-Union fund and received 
from it fodder grain and mixed fodder for large livestock complexes and followed up 
the meat to All-Union funds.      
 
Land reform and land privatization in 1997 – 2000s, reorganization of large-scale 
collective enterprises (kolkhozes and sovkhozes) into peasants’ farms or their 
associations, limited liability societies, producers’ cooperatives and joint stock 
companies resulted in drastic and not always positive changes both in economy and 
organization of agriculture, and in the structure and qualitative characteristics of grain 
crops sector development. The trend of those changes can be judged from the available 
data of grain crops areas transformation, their production volumes and capacity of main 
crops – wheat and maize (Table 1).    
Table 1 
Grain Sector Transformation (growth rates, %), 1985 – 1999  
Area  Production Yield  Years 
grain 
crops,  
total 
wheat maize  grain 
crops,  
total 
wheat maize  grain 
crops,  
total 
wheat maize  
1985-99 2.0 3.1 3.0 -0.1 0.6 0.9 -2.0 -2.4 -2.0 
          
1985-90 1.9 4.0 -0.1 7.1 10.6 3.3 5.1 6.4 3.4 
1990-95 2.0 3.3 2.4 -4.3 -2.9 -4.9 -6.2 -6.0 -7.2 
1995-99 3.8 0.3 7.3 1.4 -3.4 7.0 -2.3 -3.7 -0.1 
Source: Statistical Yearbooks for 1990-1999 and 2002, DSS 
During the 70’s and 90’s dynamics of the wheat production as main qualitative grain 
crop for bread-making had the following average annual production volumes: in 1971-
1980 – 983.0 thousand tons, in 1981-1990 – 932.7 thousand tons, in 1991-1995 – 
1062.2 thousand tons and in 1996-2000 – 860.2 thousand tons. Record-breaking yields 
of wheat for 90’s took place in 1990 (1129 thousand tons), 1993 (1393 thousand tons) 
1995 (1126 thousand tons) and 1997 (1153 thousand tons) and also later – in 2001 
(1181 thousand tons) and 2002 (1113 thousand tons). 
 
In the period immediately preceding year 2003, which was extremely unfortunate for a 
wheat yield, the wheat situation both in Moldova and its neighboring countries on the 
whole turned out to be safe (Graph 1), that made it possible to satisfy its internal needs 
and provide for wheat export as well.   
Graph 1 
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Recently, rather great volumes of wheat production were obtained mostly because of an 
increase of its areas from 220 – 280 thousand ha in 80’s up to 340 – 370 thousand ha in 
the second half of 90’s and even more than 400 thousand ha in 2001 and 2002 (433.9 
and 442.7 thousand ha respectively). The share of wheat went up noticeably in the 
structure of grain crops areas: from 34.6% in 1985 to 38.7% in 1995-2000 and up to 40-
41% in 2001 and 2002. Results for wheat crop capacity and quality were less 
impressing. Thus, if in 1971-1980 the average annual wheat crop capacity made up 32.8 
centner/ha, in 1981-90s – 34.4 centner/ha, then in 1991-2000 – only 28.5 centner/ha, 
and in succeeding years even less. One of the unfavorable trend of wheat production 
structure occurred during recent years is the decline of bread wheat share from 68% in 
1998 to 44% in 2003 and increase of fodder wheat share to 50-56%. 
 
1.2. Forms and methods of state administration of grain sector under the 
planned system and during privatization period 
 
In the system of planned economy and later in the Republic of Moldova till 1998 the 
grain sector was under a direct control of the state: firstly, it was the Department of 
Grain Products under the Government (in the 50’s), then – Ministry of Purchase (from 
the 60’s till 1985) and in 1985-1990 it was Ministry of Grain Products. Permanent 
reorganization of administration of this sector as well as of the others was undertaken in 
search of optimal variants – for half a century after the W.W.II it took place not less 
than 12 times! However, the heart of the matter remained unchanged: regions, 
kolkhozes and sovkhozes received from above plans for grain production, and then the 
grain was delivered to the state in the form of enterprises of grain products sector 
against the state deliveries, state orders and contracts at the prices established by the 
state. 
 
The Ministry of Grain Products administrated grain elevators, groats and feed mills and 
bread-baking plants; functions of those enterprises were limited to procurement and 
production tasks. Investment decision, credit relations and foreign-trade were fully 
within the competence of governmental bodies. It was a common practice that sectoral 
administration agencies financed weak, unprofitable enterprises at the expense of 
income of profitable ones. 
 
First signs of erosion of planned system in the grain sector showed in 1989 when 
instead of Ministry of Grain Products appeared Cooperative and State Association of 
Grain Purchase and Processing “Moldhlebproduct”. However, it existed for a short time 
and soon the old system was restored first as State Production Association of Grain 
Purchase and Processing “Cereale” (1990-1994), and later as Department of Grain 
Products under the Ministry of Agriculture of the RM. State Grain Inspection and 
Republican Industrial Laboratory of Feed Mill and Grain Products - two legally 
independent entities operated under this Department. Government Decision # 623 of 
August 17 1994 entrusted the Department with the following functions:  
• to administrate processes of grain purchase, storage and processing for 
governmental resources and reserve;    
• to pursue unified scientific and technical policy; 
• to control quality of grain and products of grain processing; 
• to carry out analysis of effectiveness of grain products sector;  
• to study market conditions and perform foreign-economy activity.  
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At that, the Department had to realize its functions by means of administrative-
command impact upon lower enterprises including assignment and dismission of their 
managing staff, issuing instructions for them, supervising financial and economic 
discipline of the enterprises. The Department was financed due to deductions from 
lower enterprises and organizations as well as out of funds received for works and 
services that were carried out on a contractual basis.   
 
Since mass privatization of state property and orientation towards development of 
competition environment in the national economy, it was the “Cereale” system (the total 
storage capacity being 1524 thousand tons of grain) that as early as 1994 became an 
object of constant and persistent attention of IMF and World Bank as a monopolist 
system, which, therefore, required to be mandatory reorganized through privatization. 
Yielding to the insistent demands of international financial organizations in conformity 
with the Law on State Privatization Programme in the Republic of Moldova for 1995-
1996 enterprises of this sector were reorganized into joint-stock companies in the 
shortest time (May – August 1995).      
 
The State Privatization Programme stipulated for almost complete privatization of most 
of grain products enterprises. Thus, the Department efforts to fulfill its functions were 
reduced to zero and forms and methods of activities applied by the Department as well 
as its system of financing became illegal per se. Corporate management of the sector 
was destroyed and the state share in the property of most of its enterprises reduced to 
30-40%. The state retained a control stock (55-84%) in a limited group of enterprises: 
“Cereale-Floresti”, “Cereale-Cupcini”, “Elevatorul Iargara”, “Rediul-Mare” and “Glia 
Buliboaca”.    
 
In its new status the enterprises of this sector were governed by the Law on Joint-Stock 
Companies and own statutes. Since an authorized person assigned by the Department of 
Privatization and State Property Administration became plenipotentiary representative 
of state interests at those joint-stock companies, the Department of Grain Products was 
deprived of this last lever of administrative influence on the enterprises.         
 
At the same time since 1997 mass privatization of land and reorganization of large-scale 
farms (sovkhozes and kolkhozes) began, which temporary, for several years, resulted in 
additional complications in provision of country’s food security. In order to reduce 
repercussions of transition period and carry out state policy in the field of forming and 
effective use of the governmental resources, in 1996-1997 the Department of Grain 
Products turned to the Government more then once with a proposal to create a state-
owned holding with a right of state property shareholder in the sector enterprises. It 
implied that in case the national interests required that a number of large-scale grain 
products enterprises should de remained as state-owned the state would be able to retain 
control stocks of those enterprises, on assigning the right of possession, use and disposal 
to the state holding company or another structure which main task would be purchase of 
grain products for governmental resources and reserves. Under the market conditions 
enterprises of this holding could have competed on equal footing with simillionar 
enterprises from a private sector.   
 
It is possible that when submitting the proposal about creation of the state-owned 
holding Department of Grain Products studied its own departmental interests. However, 
there was an obvious necessity to meet state interests by division administrative 
structures into: a) structures that would carry out economic-organizing functions and b) 
structures that would fulfill state control of purchase, additional processing and storage 
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of grain product stuff. The former that would carry out economic-organizing functions 
at the lowermost level were already created on a market basis and operated as 
autonomous units – joint-stock companies. 
 
As for functions of state regulation during the last period of activity of the Department 
(till March 1998), with the Department’s aim the state interests in the grain sector 
appeared mainly as wheat purchases for the state needs. The government annually 
issued a decision on creation of reserves of certain type of wheat for provision for the 
population with bread and it included volumes of supply, certain debts that were repaid 
for with those purchase and wheat prices bought for state resources.  
 
Episode 1. One of the most exotic attempts of state regulation under conditions of the 
emerging grain market was the Government Decision # 620 (1997) that obliged grain 
product enterprises to purchase for state resources 250 thousand tons of grain at a fixed 
price of 700 MDL per ton, almost twice (!) as much as its market price. One half of the 
grain should be purchased from farms that had debts of state budget and Social Fund, 
the other half - by means of direct contracts.  It was declared that this document was 
issued to secure a stable supply of bread to the population. At the same time another 
aspect of such a decision can be found: a tendency of the state to by all means fill in the 
tax gaps of the state budget.  The budget debts of enterprises could have been paid off 
by providing grain for the state resources or, as it is regulated by the law on the state 
budget – to make a purchase for the state purposes at the expense of budgetary funds.  
In the absence of these funds the budget debts could have been paid off in kind with the 
grain needed by the state at the agreed market prices.  
 
In stead of that rather curious actions from the legal and economic point of view were 
taken, which, considering both interests of agricultural producers and “certain groups” 
to the detriment of the state ones, complicated financial situation of enterprises-
purchasers of grain since it was later sold at prices of 1998, which were much lower 
than purchase prices of 1997. 
 
On fulfilling Government Decision # 620 the grain sector enterprises arranged 
“expensive credits” with commercial banks, as they were refused to get low-interest 
centralized credits of National Bank, and they paid to the state for the grain accepted in 
the state resources that was received as a settlement of budget debts. In fact they had to 
put a debt burden of agricultural enterprises on themselves. Monthly payment of 
interests for the credits increased the cost of purchased grain. For example, JSC 
“Cereale-Vulcanesti” paid 97 thousand MDL as interests for the credit from “Moldova-
Agroindbank” of 3.9 million MDL with 30% annual rate. Thus, for one year they 
transferred 1.16 million MDL.   
 
For the yield of 1997, enterprises under the Department of Grain Products purchased 
154.4 thousand tons of wheat altogether. However, bread-making plants for which this 
grain was mainly purchased acted based on market conditions and preferred buying 
flour on the open market, than the flour made of grain from the state resources. As a 
result, for the whole country in 1997 only 100.3 thousand tons of flour was sold from 
the state resources which are by 46 thousand tons or 32% less than in 1996 whereas 
volumes of bread production of the above years were the same.   
 
In most cases terms of credits repayment to commercial banks from the grain product 
enterprises were not met as the “expensive” grain remained unrealized. Cost of 
unrealized grain increased progressively due to the charged interest rates and imposed 
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fines as the credits were not repaid during the set terms. Having dictated to “own 
enterprises” high prices for grain purchase for the state resources the government 
cleared the way to more profitable prices for flour from private commercial structures.  
Bread-making plants bought flour from commercial structures at a half price of what 
was offered by enterprises that not long ago were state-owned, i.e. at 350-400 MDL per 
ton. However, producers calculated bread cost value on the basis of 700 MDL per ton of 
flour and thus almost doubled their own profitability. 
 
In accordance with the results of this “episode” the bread-making plants received 
additional profit at the rate of 35 million MDL, a certain group of private firms that sold 
flour gained 22.5 million MDL. For all those earnings the fact that the price for bread 
remained the same without any decrease was the most amazing thing. Finally, in one 
year, when grain product enterprises were on the verge of bankruptcy the Ministry of 
Economy allowed them to realize the grain from state resources “not for its direct 
purpose”. 
 
Thus, this was the first large-scale experience of “state regulation” in the newly 
forming market of grain, flour and bread.  And its results were by no means for the 
benefits of the state and its population: the state “helping the agriculture” bought 
overpriced grain unclaimed later by the bread market; prices for bread were not 
lowered and grain was sold at prices lower than the purchase ones. 
 
Episode 2. The next experiment of state bodies on the grain market took place during 
1998/1999. In 1999 when the wheat yield (800 thousand tons) was a bit lower than in 
previous two years (1153 and 952 thousand tons respectively), there appeared a dearth 
of grain and flour resources for the bread-making in the country. And, as a result, prices 
for bread grew once again.  
 
The situation was also caused by inefficient work of state structures. Indeed, stocks of 
bread wheat of state resources on 01.09.1998 made up 75 thousand tons.  This amount 
was sufficient till the next yield. In July 1998 grain product enterprises reduced flour 
price by 15-20%. However bread prices did not go down though the flour makes 65% of 
the bread price. The flour was still sold at that reduced price at a later time. While there 
was some grain from state resources the flour price including VAT for extra-class was 
1176 MDL, I class – 1032 MDL and II class – 912 MDL per ton. These prices were 
unchanged for more than a year.  But in the market conditions bread-making plants 
preferred not to use grain from state resources but to buy flour from private commercial 
structures. In order to get rid of state resources of grain – a generator of break-neck 
increase of losses the enterprises of “grain products system” had to sell it by all possible 
means and they managed to do it in spring of 1999. But at what price! About 20 
thousand tons of bread grain was used as fodder and more than 35 thousand tons of it 
were sold abroad or used for other nonfood purposes.   
 
Epilogue of such revealing episode of post-privatization period in the market of grain, 
flour and bread was official instruction of the President of the RM P. Lucinschi to the 
persecutor’s office to find out where and why the grain disappeared from state reserves 
and who was to blame for it? The blame was laid upon “unknown, difficult conditions” 
of transition from a planned economy to a market one… 
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2. Wheat market development during the transitional period 
2.1. Legal basis for the grain market regulation  
 
Legal documents and mechanisms that regulate market relations in the agricultural 
sector of the Republic of Moldova, including those related to grain production and 
commercialization, began to develop back in the first half of 1990s alongside with 
general liberalization trends of economic entities, internal trade and foreign economic 
contacts. 
 
However, even though the first decade of reforms is over, and though currently private 
sector actually dominates in the national economy (more than 70% of GDP), this legal 
field is still not systematized. Besides, from time to time, the Government, ministries 
and departments make attempts to apply to this sphere administrative means that restrict 
competition among manufacturers and regulate prices and foreign trade. 
 
Depending on a specific annual situation with grain (bumper crop or crop setback) the 
Government makes relevant decisions, including setting of indicative prices for export, 
recommendations concerning trade through the stock exchange, etc. As a rule, these 
actions provoke objections from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
as it has happened in year 2003, when under their pressure the Government of the RM 
had to issue two (!) decisions of a similar nature “on elimination of official and non-
official hindrances in operations of economic entities”. The first of these decisions 
(22.04.2003) stated: 
1. “Ministries and departments are prohibited to set any restrictions through 
departmental normative acts, inquiry of additional documents, besides those 
determined by normative acts regulating external trade, and establishment of 
indicative prices for export and other actions making export activity of domestic 
economic units more difficult. 
2. Central public administration bodies are to: 
• revise departmental normative acts to bring them into accordance 
with requirements of the first paragraph of this decision and inform 
the Government about the actions made in 30 days; 
• obligatory publish in the Monitorul Oficial internal normative acts 
that affect negatively or regulate external trade regime, after 
preliminary coordination with the Ministry of Justice”. 
 
In three months a need in an additional Government Prescription (7.07.2003) occurred; 
this document stated the following: “All ministries, departments and agencies will do 
their utmost to facilitate exports and ensure all necessary support to exporting economic 
agents.  The above-mentioned institutions and their employees will use as guideline in 
their activity the fact that the decision whether or not to export, at what price, through 
which marketing channels, and whether or not to use the Commodity Exchange to 
purchase the goods to be exported, is entirely up to each economic agent”. 
 
As for the grain sector, despite its utmost importance for the food security of the 
country, the legal basis that regulates production and commercialization of grain is still 
quite disintegrated. First of all, unlike other countries that are neighbors and main 
foreign trade partners (Romania, Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan), Moldova still does 
not have a Law on Grain and Grain Market3, which would regulate production, creation 
                                                 
3  Meanwhile, there are laws on wine, on walnuts, etc. 
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of reserves, processing and trade in grain, grain quality control, and other. Such a law is 
“currently being developed”. Currently, in the Moldova’s legislation in force there is 
only the one law, which is directly related to the grain sector – Law on Production and 
Utilization of Seed Material. This law regulates the system of production, control and 
distribution of seeds, including also grain-crops. 
 
After privatization of land, liquidation of large collective farms (kolkhozes and 
sovkhozes) and restructuring of production in the agricultural sector based on private 
ownership, the responsibility of the Government has shifted to: а) maintenance of the 
state reserves of grain for possible (if prices for bread go up) interventions in the 
domestic market of wheat, flour and bread; and b) monitoring of the situation in the 
external grain market and depending on the circumstances responding to it in the field 
of export-import operations. 
 
Recently, it was considered based on previous experience mainly that the state reserve 
of wheat should be maintained on the level of 30-50 thousand tons (which was not 
always the case). As for the relations with the external grain market, they devised 
depending on the specifics of the given year. Thus, Government Decision # 588 on 
actions to provide needs of state institutions in bread and bread products, bar their 
deficit on internal market, as well as unjustified increase in prices for these products 
was issued on July 5, 2001. It stipulated for: formation of a state reserve of bread wheat 
of 50.0 thousand tons; recommend local bodies to form together with economic units 
wheat reserves in regions; establish reference purchase prices; recommend commercial 
banks to grant bread-baking enterprises lax credits for purchase of bread wheat; 
establish reference prices for exported wheat of no less than 95% of prices on regional 
and international markets. Later, in 2002 – a bumper-crop year for wheat – the 
Government adopted Prescription # 86-d on promotion of grain export; it required a 
specially established Commission comprised of the representatives of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food, Ministry of Economy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, «to carry 
out on-going monitoring of situations in foreign grain markets, take active measures 
related to export of domestic grain, proposing, if necessary, changes in the current 
normative and legal acts depending on the market conditions, and to inform 
permanently the President of the country, Chairperson of the Parliament and top 
Government on the situation in the relevant area». 
 
As the results of the next year – 2003 (lean year for wheat) – showed, implementation of 
this intention was far from being perfect both in terms of monitoring of the situation and 
formation of the state grain reserve, and in terms of the grain import, especially during 
the first half of the year, when prices for wheat in the world market were relatively 
good. 
 
Starting from aspiration of the Republic of Moldova for a possibly more productive 
participation in the processes of European integration, harmonization of legislation and 
government actions in spheres related to food security of the country has apparently to 
be realized as close to the practice of the European Union as possible. The experience of 
the EU accumulated during the process of realization of the Common Agricultural 
Policy is evidence of the necessity of a system approach to development of agricultural 
sector as regards goals and methods of their achievement through liberalization of the 
market, the corresponding tax and tariff policy, compensation of losses, granting 
subventions, etc.  
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During the improvement of the legal basis, forms and methods of the grain market 
development in the Republic of Moldova it is appropriate to consider rules and 
procedures regulating grain market in the EU, specifically the Council Regulation 
(EEC) on the common organization of the market in cereals of June 30, 1992, which 
after ten years of implementation taking into account new realities of the common 
European grain market has transformed into the Council Regulation (EC) on the 
common organization of the market in cereals of September 29, 2003, brought into 
effect beginning from the 2004/2005 marketing year.  
 
As regards the grain pricing policy, three price categories are applied in the EU 
practice: indicative or target prices, threshold prices and guaranteed or intervention 
prices. 
 
For the Republic of Moldova, which intends to expand trade with the EU, the following 
provisions of the Council Regulation are especially important: “the creation of a single 
Community market for cereals involves the introduction of a trading system at the 
external frontiers of the Community. This trading system complementing the 
intervention system and including import duties and export refunds should, in principle, 
stabilise the Community market. The trading system should be based on the 
undertakings accepted under the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The 
export refund system is to be applied to processed products containing cereals to enable 
them to participate in the world market.  
 
In order to monitor the volume of trade in cereals with third countries, provision should 
be made for an import and export licence scheme with the lodging of a security to 
ensure that the transactions for which such licences are requested are effected.”4. 
 
2.2. Transformation of the grain production sector: economic agents, land 
tenure, results 
 
Radical changes that have been taking place in the Moldovan society and economy 
since the beginning of 1990’s, essentially changed relations in the agriculture as well.  
The most important of these changes are: 
• land reform and allotment of land to peasants; 
• privatization of means of production and allotment of in-king property to 
peasants; 
• formation and rapid development of the individual sector based on private 
property; 
• reorganization of farms that used to be in collective and cooperative ownership; 
• formation of the market system of interaction between agricultural economic 
entities and food processing industry; 
• marketing spin-off of export oriented branches; 
• appearance of pioneer commercial agricultural service companies and 
associations. 
 
Before starting an entrepreneurial activity nearly all agricultural enterprises changed 
their status and forms of functioning having gained economic independence.  
Enterprises were reorganized in peasant farms, limited liability companies, 
                                                 
4 Council Regulation (EC) #1784/2003 of 29 September 2003 on the common organization of the market 
in cereals 
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cooperatives, joint-stock companies, etc., and pretty soon – in 3-4 years – they started to 
be the core of the agricultural business. It is noteworthy that while in 1991 the statistics 
registered 1004 economic entities in agriculture, including 534 kolkhozes, 400 
sovkhozes and 70 inter-farm enterprises, in five years, in 1996, the figure was already 
17240, including both «old» forms – 236 sovkhozes, 395 kolkhozes, 34 inter-farm 
enterprises, and new forms – 160 joint-stock companies, 194 production cooperatives, 
11 limited liability companies, 146 peasant farm associations, and 16064 peasant 
farms5. Upon completion of the land reforms, liberalization of the agrarian sector 
economy and appearance of the land market the number of economic entities operating 
in agriculture increased in 2000 up to 19.4 thou units, and in 2002 up to 31.4 thou 
units6. 
 
Transformation of the land use happened rather quickly in the second half of 1990’s, as 
it is shown in the Table 2. 
Table 2 
Land tenure (as percentage of agricultural land) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
State sector 32.3 26.7 25.2 31.2 30.1 16.7 17.3 17.7 17.5 16.6 
State farms 27.0 23.4 20.4 14.6 12.8 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Reserve fund 0.0 0.0 0.1 12.7 13.3 13.4 13.6 14.0 14.1 14.1 
Corporate sector 59.4 63.0 63.0 56.2 56.8 67.9 64.8 61.4 57.2 46.1 
Collectives 59.4 63.0 58.8 49.2 45.2 39.3 23.1 15.2 12.7 10.4 
New corporate 
farms 
0.0 0.0 4.2 6.2 8.9 27.6 38.9 43.0 41.7 33.9 
Farmer 
associations 
- - - 0.8 2.7 1.0 2.8 3.2 2.8 1.8 
Individual sector 8.3 10.3 11.7 12.6 13.2 15.3 18.0 20.9 25.3 36.7 
Peasant farms - - 0.0 0.3 0.7 2.4 4.8 7.8 12.2 22.3 
Household plots 8.3 10.3 11.7 12.3 12.5 12.9 13.2 13.1 13.3 14.4 
Source: National Land Relations and Cadastre Agency  
As a result, currently in the Republic of Moldova more than 2/3 of agricultural lands are 
in private ownership, and peasant/farmer’s holdings prevail among the economic 
entities in rural areas. The next item on the agenda of agrarian reforms is viability of 
structures that formed in the agricultural sector. 
 
Adjustment of the agrarian sector to market reforms, development of new financial, 
labor, production and social relations was aggravated by drastic reduction in agricultural 
production, which in 2000 comprised only 45% from the level of 1990. Sectoral 
structure of agriculture has changed; its production infrastructure and social sphere of 
rural areas have collapsed; mass unemployment appeared alongside with mass labor 
migration of peasants abroad, all which resulted in the decreased share of economically 
active population in rural areas. Nevertheless, since 1999, there was certain growth (in 
comparable prices) of agricultural production, crop production first of all. In 2002 crop 
production in current prices comprised 6148 million MDL versus 2 687 million MDL in 
1995. Animal breeding sector indices are less impressive - 2 995 million MDL in 2002 
versus 1 393 million MDL in 1995 (Table 3).  It has to be noted that significant growth 
in agricultural production from 1999 to 2002 is explained rather by growing prices for 
agricultural products after the crisis in August 1998, when prices grew by 3 – 4 time, 
than by growth in production proper. 
 
                                                 
5 Agricultura Republicii Moldova, DSS, Chişinău, 1996, p. 8-9 
6 Anuarul statistic al Republicii Moldova – 2002, DSS, Chişinău, 2002, p. 261 
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On the whole, despite problems of the transition period, domestic agriculture perfectly 
satisfies the country’s need in food, including also almost by 100% – in wheat, sugar, 
vegetables, fruit, grapes and sunflower. 
Table 3 
Agricultural Production in All Categories of Farming (current prices)  
million MDL 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Agriculture production, total 4243 4639 5100 4775 6396 8268 8646 9408 
Including:         
Crop production 2687 2941 3186 2875 4206 5790 5727 6148 
Live farming production  1393 1552 1730 1699 2004 2202 2655 2995 
Services 163 146 184 201 186 276 264 265 
Unit weight of crop production in total cost 
of agriculture production, %  
 
 
63.3 
 
 
63.4 
 
 
62.5 
 
 
60.2 
 
 
65.8 
 
 
70.0 
 
 
66.2 65.3 
Unit weight of live farming production in 
total cost of agriculture production, %  
 
32.8 
 
33.4 
 
33.9 
 
35.6 
 
31.3 
 
26.6 
 
30.7 31.8 
Source:  Anuarul statistic al Republicii Moldova, 2002, p. 307 
 
Rapidity of changes in the nature of ownership and forms of management in Moldovan 
agriculture still leaves open the issues of stability and effectiveness of new system of 
management in the agrarian sector. Most of these issues are of long-term nature: sources 
of financial resources for modernization of agriculture, efficiency of land use and 
preservation of its fertility, fighting pests and crops deceases, promoting high 
marketability (export orientation) and competitive capacity of production, technical 
renewal and implementation of effective know-how, development of agroservice etc. 
 
Under this condition effective use of land remains a key problem. According to the 
Land Cadastre (2003) the state owns 13% of the total area of agricultural land, including 
10% of lands of state reserve fund. Main part of agricultural land (87%) passed into 
private sector in which, gradually, on the market basis, both a correlation of individual 
and corporate sectors and economic capacity of enterprises of different organizational 
forms and land owners categories are crystallizing (Table 4). 
Table 4 
Structure of agricultural land by categories of land users  
On January 1, 2001 On January 1, 2002 
Land users Area, thou 
ha. 
Structure, 
% 
Area, thou 
ha. 
Structure, 
% 
Total agricultural land 2278.3 100 2274.5 100 
including by land users:     
Enterprises and organizations 754.1 33.1 751.3 33.0 
Farms (private farmer) 791.7 34.8 796.5 35.0 
including:     
with average size of plot of land less than 
50 ha. 648.7 28.5 603.1 26.5 
including:     
With average size of plot of land less 
than 10 ha. … … 595.3 26.2 
Personal subsidiary plots (household 
land plot and vegetable garden) 315.3 13.8 312.8 13.8 
Horticultural associations and farm 
land for vegetable growing 5.4 0.2 7.3 0.3 
Other land users 411.8 18.1 406.6 17.9 
Source: Agricultural activity of personal subsidiary plots of citizens and farms in the Republic of Moldova 
in 2002(statistical study results), Chisinau, 2003 
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Grain production as can be seen in the Table 5 covers major part of sown areas (64-
69%) the last three years.  At the same time areas of winter wheat (from 22.6% in 1995 
up to 28.1% in 2002) and maize (from 20.1 up to 28.4%) increased. As for the other 
crops areas of sunflower widened, forage crops area drastically expanded which very 
negatively tells on rotations fore crops for winter crops.   
Table 5 
Structure of use of sown areas in farms of all categories, %  
Crop type 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Sown area, total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
including:         
Grain and leguminous plants, total   
54.1 
 
53.6 
 
61.9 61.4 63.1 64.7 69.2 68.0 
including:         
Winter wheat 22.6 21.9 23.1 23.3 22.9 24.2 27.9 28.1 
Winter barley  4.1 3.1 3.1 2.8 2.8 3.3 3.9 - 
Spring barley 3.2 2.8 3.8 4.3 45 3.6 2.4 - 
Maize for corn 20.1 22.2 28.1 26.2 27.2 28.9 30.3 28.4 
Leguminous plant 3.2 2.7 2.8 3.5 4.0 3.3 3.3 3.6 
Industrial crops, total 16.7 19.7 17.6 20.2 21.6 21.6 19.4 21 
including:         
Sugar beet  5.4 5.0 4.6 4.7 4.1 4.1 3.8 3.2 
Sunflower  9.3 13.0 11.3 13.4 14.6 14.9 13.4 16.3 
Soy 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.1 0.8 - 0.6 
Tobacco  1.3 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.1 0.6 
Potato, vegetables and melons and gourds  
8.2 
 
7.8 
 
8.1 
 
7.7 
 
8.2 
 
8.2 
 
7.3 6.8 
including:         
Potato 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.5 4.3 2.7 2.8 
Vegetables planted openly 3.9 3.4 3.5 3.2 3.2 3.3 4.0 3.5 
Fodder crops 21.0 19.0 12.4 10.7 7.1 5.5 4.1 4 
 
Source: Anuarul statistic al Republicii Moldova, 2002; Moldova în cifre - 2003, p. 177 
 
It is worth asking: how did the changes in land ownership and types of economic 
entities effect upon grain sector? Certain information can be found in Tables 6 – 8. 
 
Table 6 
Gross output of agriculture, by types of ownership in comparable prices of 2000 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Total, millionlion MDL 10292.0 9070.0 10108.0 8935.0 8184.3 7917.0 8427.6 8680.9 
   of which by types of ownership:         
State 1021.9 645.1 506.7 328.2 183.1 98.2 78.8 76.6 
Private 9270.9 8425.6 9601.3 8606.8 8001.2 7818.8 8348.8 8604.3 
   of which:         
     Collective 5143.2 4110.6 4757.2 3442.2 2390.7 2034.0 2318.2 2364.2 
     Farms (private farmer) and  
     households of population  4127.7 4314.4 4844.1 5164.6 5610.5 5784.8 6030.6 6240.1 
Unit weight in private property, %:         
     Collective 55.5 48.8 49.5 40.0 29.9 26.0 27.8 27.5 
     Farms (private farmer) and  
     households of population 44.5 51.2 50.5 60.0 70.1 74.0 72.2 72.5 
Source: Moldova in Figures, 2003, р. 180 
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First of all, as seen from the Table 6 the private sector has become predominant in 
agriculture. In the private sector the share of companies with collective ownership is 
27.5% of agricultural gross output and 72.5% belong to the farms (private farmer) and 
households of population. The share of households’ plots is unexpectedly high, although 
they are in possession of less than one hectare of land. Today the households are the 
leaders in production of potato, vegetables, meat and milk.   
 
In the past grain production was the prerogative of large collective farms. Land 
privatization and large-scale reorganization of these farms dramatically changed the 
structure of “players” in the grain production sector. Now the largest areas under 
cereals, 42.4% in 2002, are concentrated in agricultural enterprises the majority of 
which work on large areas leased from peasants (Table 7) and practically the same share 
- 40.2% in farms (private farmer). The same range of these agricultural enterprises is the 
main exporter of grain (wheat, barley), whereas peasant farms keep the greater part of 
the crop (mainly corn) for consumption in their own farms. 
 
Table 7 
Structure of Sown Areas under the Agricultural Crops by Categories of Farms in 2002 
Farms Categories 
Including 
 
 
Types of Cultivation Areas 
Farms of All 
Categories Agricultural 
Enterprises 
Farms (private 
farmers) 
Households 
of population 
Whole sown area, total, % 100 41.1 38.4 17.5 
including     
Cereals 100 42.4 40.2 17.4 
Industrial crops 100 55.6 41.0 3.4 
Potato, vegetables and watermelons 100 12.9 20.3 66.8 
Fodder crops 100 64.6 25.5 9.9 
Source: Anuarul statistic al Republicii Moldova, 2003 
 
The same conclusion is confirmed by the data on the production structure (by crops) in 
the three main farm categories of the agrarian sector: companies (joint stock companies, 
cooperatives, and associations), farms and personal household farms (Table 8) 
Table 8 
Production Structure by Farm Categories as Percentage of Total Production 
Types of Crops and Production 1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  
Agricultural enterprises 
Grain and leguminous plants  71.7 58.5 61.8 54.1 42.1 34.9 40.0 
Sugar beet  99.5 98.6 97.7 93.5 78.5 69.3 68.1 
Sunflower 95.1 90.2 87.6 78.0 60.6 49.5 47.3 
Potato  1.8 1.5 2.3 0.6 0.4 2.6 2.7 
Vegetables 57.5 40.4 37.3 29.0 23.1 21.1 17.1 
Meat (slaughter weight) 43.0 37.4 34.5 27.1 20.3 11.4 6.7 
Milk 37.3 29.9 19.4 15.9 11.1 7.3 6.1 
Eggs 43.1 42.3 40.8 42.6 39.8 39.3 41.0 
Households of population 
Grain and leguminous plants  24.7 34.0 26.8 29.7 30.8 27.9 15.5 
Sugar beet  - - - - - - 0.6 
Sunflower 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8 4.3 
Potato  97.6 97.0 95.7 97.2 95.6 88.8 82.5 
Vegetables 40.7 56.8 57.1 63.8 66.0 55.0 59.9 
Meat (slaughter weight) 56.0 59.7 58.6 62.1 64.2 64.1 62.7 
Milk 60.4 63.1 70.5 70.1 66.9 60.9 56.1 
Eggs 54.2 52.0 52.3 48.3 49.8 47.8 40.8 
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Types of Crops and Production 1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  
Farms(private farmer) 
Grain and leguminous plants  3.6 7.5 11.4 16.2 27.1 37.2 42.5 
Sugar beet  0.5 1.4 2.3 6.5 21.5 30.7 31.3 
Sunflower 3.2 8.5 11.2 20.9 38.5 49.7 48.4 
Potato  0.6 1.5 2.0 2.2 4.0 8.6 14.8 
Vegetables 1.8 2.8 5.6 7.2 10.9 23.9 23.0 
Meat (slaughter weight) 1.0 2.9 6.9 10.8 15.5 24.5 30.6 
Milk 2.3 7.0 10.1 14.0 22.0 31.8 37.8 
Eggs 2.7 5.7 6.9 9.1 10.4 12.9 18.2 
Source: Anuarul statistic al Republicii Moldova, 2002, р. 316 
 
In Moldova, where 54.4% of population live in the rural area and the majority of town 
dwellers have relatives in villages, availability of great stock of grain in peasants farms 
is not only an insurance reserve (seeds, flour and bread) for themselves but in lean 
years, as it appeared in 2003, an peculiar buffer of bread situation on a national scale.  
 
According to the data of the Department of Statistics and Sociology, a clearly defined 
trend of the transition period in Moldova is not only a decrease of bread and bakeries 
consumption per capita but a reduction of sales of bread, pasta, cereals, etc. per capita as 
well. In addition to the evident shift of greater part of bread production from the state to 
private sector and households, a dramatic expansion of poverty zone in the country has 
reflected on the mentioned figures. While FAO’s daily rate of food consumption for 
countries with warm climate is about 2100 calories and actual consumption in Moldova 
is about 1800 calories, according to UNDP estimates not less than 10% of the country’s 
population consumes less than 1500 calories, which is recognized by FAO as extreme 
malnutrition. 
 
2.3. Wheat utilization: consumption, state reserves, export and import  
 
A new way of life of the state and population, that has been formed since early 90’s in 
the Republic of Moldova, has changed not only the sphere of grain production but the 
main ways of its utilization as well: consumption of grain, flour and bread by the 
population, seed fund formation, creation of the state reserves, grain‘s export and 
import. 
 
For nearly half a century (after drought and famine in 1946/1947) Moldova and its 
population did not suffer pressing need in foodstuffs including bread though some 
problems appeared in 1964 and late 90’s. In 60’s average annual grain production was 
about 500 thousand tons, in70’s – 983 thousand tons, in 80’s – 932.7 thousand tons, in 
1991-1995 – 1062.2 thousand tons and in 1996-2000 – 860.2 thousand tons. Under 
these safe enough conditions the country has not resorted to large-scale wheat import, 
its economic entities created grain reserves on elevators – former enterprises of 
“Cereale” system, in some of which the state share came to 30-84%. For instance, for 
the crop of 2002 the proportions of grain utilization were: seed fund – 14.0%, reserve 
fund – 19.5%, payment of land tenure, labor – 29.6%, export – 31.9% and forage – 
5.0%.  
 
It is commonly accepted that 400 thousand tons of bread wheat are sufficient for the 
country’s domestic consumption and the state reserves, which are steadily replenished, 
should be kept in the limits of monthly needs required for bread-making i.e. about 30.0 
thousand tons. Before liquidation of “Cereale” state reserves of grain concentrated at its 
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enterprises accounted annually for 150-200 thousand tons; one of aspects of the 
demonopolization policy that the World Bank insisted upon was reduction of state grain 
reserves7. 
 
In 90’s, sizeable rise in selling prices of bread wheat and bread took place twice – in 
1994 and 1999, flour prices has risen starting with 2000.   
Graph 2 
Evolution of wheat, flour and bread prices  
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Source: DSS, Buletinul informativ al preţurilor 
 
In 90’s a general tendency in bread and bakery consumption was a reduction by 
approximately 25% against the preceding decade that obviously can be explained by 
financial problems experienced by the population (growth of prices, reduction of 
income). According to household budgets survey data the food products made up 30-
34% from total consumption expenses in 80’s and by the end of 90’s – already 64-67%.  
Graph 3 
Dynamics of prices for bread, flour and macaroni  
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A state food security is determined, among others, by its resources for intervention in 
case of a considerable increase in prices for vital products for the population, first of all 
– for bread. So all countries create and replenish theirs state grain reserves for doing 
that.  
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry position with regard to grain reserves is as 
follows: “only bread wheat has gone annually to the state reserve for the last 5 years.  
The state reserve administrator is National Agency of Material Reserves and 
Humanitarian Assistance. During those years a minimum reserve of wheat consisted of 
20 thousand tons, maximum – 45 thousand tons. Purchase and storage of greater 
volumes in the state reserve proves to be ineffective. First of all, Agency bears huge 
                                                 
7 Demonopolization and privatization in the system of grain and bread supply and distribution. 
USAID/CARANA Corp., Chisinau, 1996 
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losses caused by storage (for 8-10 months), that tell on a final price. Secondly, this 
volume should be sold before a new crop is gathered and for these funds the wheat of 
the new crop is purchased for replenishment. Agency practices the following way to 
procure wheat for the state reserve: auctions on wheat purchasing from producers are 
held under Agency’s aegis in all territorial bodies. As long as financial assets of Agency 
are either circulating assets or banking credits, the offered purchasing prices are similar 
with the domestic market prices. The Agency’s non-competitiveness as compared to 
other traders-purchasers is that that for the sake of equivalent purchasing prices Agency 
settles accounts with producers after expiry of the term established by the contract, but 
private companies pay immediately and in cash.  The wheat purchased for the state 
reserve is used annually in May-June for intervention into domestic market to prevent 
misbalance of prices in domestic market for that time”8. 
 
A network of grain storage enterprises unites 30 economic entities with total capacity of 
1116.0 thousand tons. Most of them (22) are privatized and in 7 of them the state share 
makes: 30-34% (Glodeni, Falesti, Lipcani and Drochia), Bulboaca – 55.1, Iargara – 
60.9% and Floresti – 84.0%. Total storage capacity in 1988 were used by 29.1%, 1999 – 
15.9%, 2000 – 13.4%, 2001 – 18.1% and 2002 - 23.4%. Tariffs for acceptance, 
processing, drying and storage of 1 ton of wheat on elevator were 42.4-55.2 MDL/ton in 
2002, which with annual volume of wheat storage on elevators of 126.7 thousand tons is 
estimated at 400-500 thou USD. Among the reasons that induce local producers to store 
grain on their own and trading companies to orient towards an “optimal” volume of 
stored grain, which is kept on either state or private elevators, are high expenses for 
transport, processing and storage of grain.   
 
One of peculiarities of the 90’s is the fact that wheat, including bread wheat, became an 
important article of Moldovan export and an extremely profitable one as internal prices 
were much lower than the international ones9. This showed mostly during the 
productive years (1995, 1997, 2001, 2002). Thus, in 2002 wheat export from Moldova 
was 376.7 thousand tons, the total value being 25.5 million USD or 1/3 of the total plant 
growing products export of that year.  
Table 9 
Moldova’s Export of Wheat and Wheat Flour, 2000 - 2003 
2000 2001 2002 2003* Products 
and 
countries 
Quantity, 
thou ton 
Value, 
thou 
USD 
Quantity, 
thou ton 
Value, 
thou 
USD 
Quantity, 
thou ton 
Value, 
thou 
USD 
Quantity, 
thou ton 
Value, 
thou 
USD 
Wheat 2.1 199.6 62.9 4351.1 376.7 25492.9 13.6 1488.0 
including  
CIS 
countries 1.7 168.4 33.3 2285.3 68.5 4603.7 0.0 0.0 
Belarus 1.7 168.4 1.1 101.9 0.8 73.3 0.0 0.0 
Ukraine 0.0 0.0 32.2 2183.4 67.7 4530.4 0.0 0.0 
EU 
countries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 55.7 3803.1 0.0 0.0 
France 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.2 1720.5 0.0 0.0 
Germany 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 511.6 0.0 0.0 
Ireland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 31.1 0.0 0.0 
Holland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 57.7 0.0 0.0 
Great 
Britain 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.1 1482.2 0.0 0.0 
                                                 
8 Particularităţile sectorului cerealier în Republica Moldova, Ministerul agriculturii, noiembrie 2003  
9 Noteworthy, grain export licenses were granted to a narrow (?!) circle of companies. Thus, these were 
JSC “Moldresurse”, Moldenergo, Moldova-Gaz and Tirex-Petrol in 1995. 
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2000 2001 2002 2003* Products 
and 
countries 
Quantity, 
thou ton 
Value, 
thou 
USD 
Quantity, 
thou ton 
Value, 
thou 
USD 
Quantity, 
thou ton 
Value, 
thou 
USD 
Quantity, 
thou ton 
Value, 
thou 
USD 
CEE 
countries 0.1 5.9 3.1 192.6 144.3 10199.8 13.6 1488.0 
Hungary 0.0 0.0 3.0 189.2 81.1 5246.6 0.0 0.0 
Lithuania 0.1 5.9 0.0 0.0 1.1 73.9 0.0 0.0 
Romania 0.0 0.0 0.1 3.4 62.1 4879.3 13.6 1488.0 
Other 
countries 0.3 25.3 26.5 1873.2 108.2 6886.3 0.0 0.0 
Virgin 
islands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 479.4 0.0 0.0 
Gibraltar 0.0 0.0 0.3 20.2 4.3 250.7 0.0 0.0 
Iceland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 41.0 0.0 0.0 
Liberia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 9.6 0.0 0.0 
Swaziland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 16.7 0.0 0.0 
Switzerland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 141.6 0.0 0.0 
Turkey 0.0 0.0 1.3 114.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
USA 0.3 25.3 24.9 1738.4 92.8 5947.3 0.0 0.0 
 
Wheat 
flour 0.8491 146.2 0.3911 63.7 7.1126 774.7 4.4798 654.7 
including  
CIS 
countries 0.2068 49.1 0.2431 36.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Azerbaijan 0.0 0.0 0.183 27.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Belarus 121.8 30.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Russia 65.0 14.2 0.0397 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ukraine 0.020 4.4 0.0204 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CEE 
countries 0.6423 97.1 0.148 27.1 7.1126 774.7 4.4798 654.7 
Romania 0.6423 97.1 0.148 27.1 7.1126 774.7 4.4798 654.7 
* 2003 preliminary data 
Source: DSS 
Geography of the wheat/flour export is quite wide, but the main part of these goods is 
exported to the neighboring countries – Romania and Ukraine (Table 9). 
Wheat/flour import to Moldova is due to two causes: either to replenish local reserves 
during less productive years, or (this occurs every year) to improve quality of bakery 
through import to the country of wheat of a higher quality (Table 10). 
Table 10 
Moldova’s Import of Wheat and Wheat Flour, 2000-2003 
2000 2001 2002 2003* 
Product and 
country Quantity, thou ton 
Value, 
thou 
USD 
Quantity, 
thou ton 
Value, 
thou 
USD 
Quantity, 
thou ton 
Value, 
thou USD 
Quantity, 
thou ton 
Value, 
thou USD 
 
Wheat 7.4405 898.9 11.8532 1544.2 0.0492 11.2 142.090 23737.6 
   including  
CIS countries 0.124 8.5 0.3676 35.5 0.0286 6.5 139.2422 23318.8 
Kazakhstan 0.0993 5.8 0.1656 9.7 0.0 0.0 48.9284 8169.4 
Russia   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 89.374 14779.7 
Ukraine 0.0247 2.7 0.202 25.8 0.0286 6.5 0.9398 369.7 
EU countries   0.003 5.0 0.0053 1.5 0.0 0.0 
Italy   0.0 0.0 0.0053 1.5 0.0 0.0 
CEE 
countries 
5.9865 702.4 9.4828 1078.6 0.0153 3.2 2.8028 414.3 
Lithuania   0.4 41.2 0.0 0.0 2.8016 414.1 
Romania 5.9865 702.4 9.0539 1035.2 0.0153 3.2 0.0012 0.2 
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2000 2001 2002 2003* 
Product and 
country Quantity, 
thou ton 
Value, 
thou 
USD 
Quantity, 
thou ton 
Value, 
thou 
USD 
Quantity, 
thou ton 
Value, 
thou USD 
Quantity, 
thou ton 
Value, 
thou USD 
 
Other 
countries 1.33 188.0 1.9998 429.6 0.0 0.0 0.045 4.5 
Lebanon       0.0003 0.1 
Turkey 1.33 188.0 991.1 152.0 0.0 0.0 0.0447 4.4 
 
Wheat flour 23.5141 3672.4 15.6333 3203.1 25.5783 6170.6 44.5197 10231.4 
   including  
CIS countries 0.0521 10.7 0.1245 17.9 0.0662 10.8 31.4937 7372.5 
Belarus   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 731.1 157.1 
Kazakhstan   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7199.7 1569.6 
Russia 0.0421 8.0 0.001 2.0 0.0022 0.5 21.2964 5106.2 
Ukraine 0.01 2.7 0.1235 17.7 0.064 10.3 2.1565 508.5 
Uzbekistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.128 31.1 
EU countries 0.1647 39.3 0.1746 31.5 0.1288 31.4 0.1126 37.6 
France   0.0021 0.3 0.0011 0.3 0.0042 1.5 
Germany 0.1127 21.6 0.1055 21.1 0.107 24.3 0.0829 23.9 
Italy 0.028 3.9 0.0293 5.6 0.0111 4.2 0.0053 2.4 
Holland 0.024 13.8 0.0022 0.3 0.002 1.1 0.0118 9.0 
CEE 
countries 7.1428 1269.8 3.7312 689.1 0.1161 28.8 3.7006 940.5 
Bulgaria 0.635 104.1 0.0403 8.7 0.02 4.6 0.102 18.0 
Hungary 2.5796 447.3 1.1405 222.1 0.0 0.0 0.02 4.9 
Romania 0.1092 21.6 0.0967 21.5 0.0961 24.2 3.5086 904.8 
Slovakia 1.06 200.7 0.7392 138.6 0.0 0.0 0.07 12.8 
Other 
countries 16.1307 2332.8 11.603 2464.6 25.2672 6099.6 9.2128 1880.8 
Norway 0.013 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0023 1.2 
Turkey 0.7197 123.2 0.012 2.4 0.0126 3.5 3.5247 552.3 
USA 15.398 2202.4 11.591 2462.2 25.2546 6096.1 5.6849 1327.1 
* 2003 preliminary data 
Source: DSS 
One should mention that prices for wheat imported to Moldova – both bread and fodder 
grain – have been rather stable during the whole decade of 1992-2002, but for a slight 
rise in prices during 1994-1997 (Graph 4). 
Graph 4 
Evolution of Import Price for Wheat, 1992 – 2002 
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Wheat import price analysis during the decade before 2003 shows that, on the whole, 
these prices corresponded to the wheat market conditions in the Central and Eastern 
European region and were not speculative, which, coupled with sufficient internal wheat 
production (on average) during these years allowed to hold prices for bread at a level 
acceptable for the population. 
 
The situation has changed dramatically in 2003, when internal wheat production, 
according to estimates, had accounted for no more than 10% of the previous year’s 
level, while over the year prices for imported wheat had doubled. 
 
3. 2003: Wheat Failure, Bread Crisis Danger 
3.1. Main trends on world and regional wheat markets 
 
Republic of Moldova is a country with small open economy. Annual level of its 
openness – percentage of external trade turnover (export + import) to GDP – is more 
than 90%, including 106.0% in 2003, which much higher than in Ukraine (62-76%) or 
Russia (30-53%). It is understandable that food security of a small country under 
unfavorable internal conditions – both natural and social – is also very vulnerable to 
external factors.  
 
This is exactly the situation Republic of Moldova got into 2003: limited internal 
resources of wheat and flour and at the same time high prices for these goods on 
external market. There has developed a situation that requires state intervention, rational 
and coordinated actions of state’s bodies and swiftness of commercial agents operating 
on the wheat market. 
 
World wheat market was in a difficult position in 2003 – production of wheat has 
dropped in countries – main wheat exporters, prices have risen and stocks have reduced 
(Table 11). 
Table 11 
World Wheat Market, million tons 
 1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 
Production 591,8 585,7 588,7 570,2 561,9 
Trade 110,3 101,2 108,7 105,9 96,5 
Utilization 594,7 599,7 609,0 615,3 615,8 
Stocks 257,3 244,0 226,0 181,0 128,3 
 
Export prices, USD/ton 112 128 127 161 147 
Source: FAO, Food outlook preview, Nov. 2003 
 
According to FAO forecast for season 2003/2004 world volume of grain trade will drop 
by 8.9% in comparison with previous period of 2002/2003, grain reserves will decrease 
almost by one third (-29.1%) and prices will exceed 147 USD/ton.      
 
In the world market main exporters of grain are Argentina, Australia, Canada, European 
Union and the USA. In the USA and Argentina year 2003 turned out to be relatively 
good for grain crop. European continent – from the Pyrenees till Urals – was struck with 
drought. France, Germany, Czech Republic, countries of the former Yugoslavia and 
Moldova suffered the heaviest losses of crop. 
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Starting from the existing circumstances many of these countries cancelled customs fees 
for wheat and flour, while it was already the fist half of 2003 when their economic 
entities have started large-scale purchasing of grain in advance. Demand of each 
country in bred-wheat was determined on the basis of its traditional norm of grain 
consumption per capita: from 80 kg/year in Estonia and Latvia up to 170 kg/year in 
Malta whilst average grain consumption per capita in EU-15 is about 100 kg/year.    
In the CIS countries average per capita needs in bread wheat are estimated at 110-135 
kg/year. In Moldova – about 115-120 kg/year (according to DSS data bread and bakery 
consumption in the country was 151 kg per capita in 2002).     
 
A considerable increase in demand for wheat from the beginning of 2003 lead to a 
decrease of its world reserves down to their lowermost level for the last 6 years: 128.3 
million in season of 2003/2004 as against 257.3 million tons in 1999/2000. Prices for 
bread wheat rose rapidly from the middle of the year when troubles with the crop in 
Europe became apparent.   
 
Then, reaction of the EU and certain countries followed: EU raised quota on bread 
wheat import by 8 million tons; Romania froze export of wheat from July 31; Ukraine 
purchased in Russia 200 thousand tons of wheat in August and 1.0 million tons more in 
September; and concluded an agreement on purchase of 1.2 million tons in 
Kazakhstan10. 
 
Moldova’s neighbor, Romania is usually an exporter of wheat, but already in February 
2003 the Government decided to utilize 200 thousand tons of strategic reserves and its 
economic entities started to external purchases including in the Republic of Moldova. 
Prices of domestic producers of wheat came to 170 USD per ton in 2003 (against 70 
USD in 2002). Prices for flour and bread have gone up accordingly. For the first six 
months of 2003 wheat import to Romania was 337.1 thousand tons at the price of about 
115 thousand tons USD/ton. Purchases were made in Hungary (190.0 thousand tons), 
Bulgaria 96.8 thousand tons), Moldova (13.6 thousand tons), Russia and Ukraine. 
Potential partners were Canada and USA. Romania’s total demand for wheat import is 
estimated at 1.0 million tons.11. 
 
In Russia wheat crop is estimated at 67.2 million tons.  Carry-over stocks of wheat 
make up 10.0 million tons and internal need of Russia is estimated to be 75.0 million 
tons. By autumn 2003 Russia’s wheat export has already reached its critical point of 5 
million tons and the Government introduced grain import restrictions (customs fee of 
25.0 euro/ton). In Kazakhstan such non-documented restrictions on grain export 
transactions have already been introduced12. 
 
Ukraine, the traditional exporter of wheat, actively makes its purchases in season of 
2003/2004.  “Bread crisis goes with arrests of officials and total control of export 
contracts”13. 
 
Considering the current situation in the region, Moldovan Government has believed that 
Russia and Kazakhstan are the most preferable partners for grain purchasing.  But only 
if the official forecasts on grain stocks of those countries are confirmed and the prices 
will be acceptable. Meanwhile, Russian experts (Institute of Agrarian Market Study 
                                                 
10 Gain Market Report, #326, International Grain Council, August 28, 2003 
11 Romania: Grain and Feed, July 2003, USDA 
12 Мировой рынок зерна, дек. 2003, УЗА-Порт 
13 Украинская зерновая ассоциация, http://www.uga-port.org.ua  
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(ИКАР), “SovEcon” Center and Unidell Group) consider that already “in spring Russia 
will face a grain deficit and rise in prices for bread” and this fact is confirmed by the 
bread prices increase in all parts of the country. In case of shortage of its own grain 
Russia usually buys it in Kazakhstan. However, in experts’ opinion of 
“Roskhlebproduct”, “Kazakh trader started rejecting prepaid contracts on grain supply 
to Russia at 100-120 USD/ton. They either expect to sell the grain at 160 USD/ton early 
next year or the republic does suffer problems with assessment of its real crop.”   
 
Meanwhile, according to FAO estimates (December 2003) tendency towards rise in 
world prices for bread wheat will linger and this will surely aggravate import of grain to 
Moldova in the first half of 2004. 
 
3.2. 2003: Wheat Production, Utilization Balance, Demand 
For Moldova the results of the agricultural year 2003 on the whole can be considered 
rather satisfactory than unsuccessful. According to the DSS estimation, the gross 
agricultural production is 86% of the level of 2002. The year was good for grapes, fruit 
and vegetables and sunflowers. However, 2003 proved to be extremely unlucky for 
winter crops (wheat, barley). It was caused by hard winter frost without snow on the 
fields, spring and summer drought. That is why grain crops gross yield was only 118 
thousand tons, including bread wheat – 101.5 thousand tons. This situation was partially 
compensated by re-sowing more than 40% of areas and taking them under corn and 
sunflower. Corn crop was 1402 thousand tons (17.4% more than in 2002) and sunflower 
– 389 thousand tons (22.7% more).           
 
General data on areas and the grain crop of 2003 are shown in the Table 12. Main part 
of wheat was harvested in less droughty Northern zone of Moldova (42.3%) and in 
lower areas of the river Prute (Ungheni, Nisporeni, Cantemir, Leovo and Cahul – 
23.9%)   
Table 12 
Effectiveness of Grain Sector in 2003 as against Preceding Five Years   
 Units 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Grain - total 
Area thou ha. 937.4 935.7 987.6 1076.8 1072 579.3 
Crop capacity centner/ha. 26.6 23.5 19.6 24.4 24.1 19.4 
Gross yield thou t 2500 220.0 1934.3 2627.9 2587 1125.4 
Winter wheat 
Area thou ha. 356.7 341.7 373.0 436.8 445.3 149.3 
Crop capacity centner/ha. 26.8 23.5 19.6 27.2 25.1 6.8 
Gross yield thou t 951.9 978.0 724.9 1181 1113 101.5 
Winter barley 
Area thou ha. 42.0 41.3 50.8 61.0 68.0 15.8 
Crop capacity centner/ha. 22.1 19.6 15.5 27.0 21.9 7.9 
Gross yield thou t 93.2 81.0 78.6 165.0 148.8 12.5 
Spring barley 
Area thou ha. 65.7 66.7 54.8 37.1 44.3 4.1 
Crop capacity centner/ha. 18.6 15.4 9.9 17.9 16.1 7.3 
Gross yield thou t 12.4 101.3 54.4 66.4 71.7 3.0 
Leguminous crop 
Area thou ha. 27.6 31.4 24.5 19.5 25.6 18.9 
Crop capacity centner/ha. 18.6 12.6 6.1 19.4 11.6 5.9 
Gross yield thou t 51.4 39.4 15.0 37.8 29.3 11.1 
Whole kernel corn 
Area thou ha. 400 403.2 441.5 471.1 446.7 557 
Crop capacity centner/ha. 31.0 28.3 23.4 23.7 26.7 27.1 
Gross yield thou t 1239 1140.3 1031.0 1118.0 1194 1402 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry 
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When the Government (Ministry of Agriculture) forecasted a wheat crop of 1.3 million 
tons for 2003 it planned to utilize the grain in accordance with the following proportion: 
seed stock – 85 thousand tons; consumption (bread) – 400 thousand tons; cattle 
breeding needs – 450 thousand tons; export – 335 thousand tons. 
 
The Republic entered 2003 with a certain grain reserve after the previous bumper-crop 
year: in stocks there was 438.1 thousand tons of wheat including 229.1 thousand tons of 
bread wheat (Table 13).   
Table 13 
January – March 2003: Wheat Stocks, thousand tons  
Utilization in January-March  Product Stocks 
1.01.2003 Consumption 
(bread) 
Export Forage  
Stocks on 
1.04.2003 
Required for the 
population’s 
consumption for 
April-August   
Surplus, 
deficit  
Wheat - 
total 
438.1 114.0 8.9 78.0 237.2 190.0 +47.2 
Including   
Bred-wheat 229.1 84.0 6.7 - 138.4 156.7 -18.3 
Class 5 
(forage) 
209.0 30.0 2.2 78.0 98.8 33.0 +65.5 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry 
 
In spring, as can be seen, the situation did not cause any alarm yet and plans to provide 
the country with wheat till the next crop (July-August) were as usual based on the 
following estimates: Moldova’s (3.6 million people) monthly demand for wheat is 38 
thousand tons for ration consumption including 28 thousand tons of bread wheat and 10 
thousand tons of Class 5. Animal husbandry demand for fodder grain is estimated at 
monthly 26 thousand tons for November-April and by 40% less (16 thousand tons) for 
May-October.     
 
First signs of the Government concerns over the grain situation already appeared in 
April-May when it became clear that frosty winter with little snow was followed by 
droughty spring and grain gross yield in the country possibly would not exceed 250-300 
thousand tons.  By that time state reserves of wheat were not more than 16-18 thousand 
tons, the major part of which was stored on elevators of Floresti, Causani, Comrat and 
Cahul. Under these circumstances, it was May when the question of necessary 
stimulation of wheat import into the country was raised for the first time. Such measures 
were taken by e.g. neighboring Romania, that not only froze wheat export but exempted 
it from customs duty which already in first six months of 2003 allowed them to import 
to the country 337.1 thousand tons of wheat at the rate of 115 USD per ton including 
grain from Moldova – 13.6 thousand tons (1.48 million USD) i.e. at the price of 109.4 
USD per ton only. This wheat export was carried out by private firms in accordance 
with the bilateral contracts based on their own interests. But peasants in villages stopped 
selling grain and flour in May, commonsense reasoning: “till I see a new crop I will 
keep the last year grain”.   
 
The Government reaction was behind, although as early as 2002 “with the purpose of 
monitoring of the situation and taking effective measures” a committee (Ministry of 
Agriculture, Ministry of Economy) was set up by the Government Prescription #86-d of 
6.09.2002, that was entrusted to “submit, as required, proposals on modifications of 
current normative and legislative acts depending on market conditions and routinely 
inform the Government about the situation in corresponding areas”14. 
                                                 
14 Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, #130, 2002, p.26 
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Reaction of the Government was expressed in their summer appeal to Russia, 
Kazakhstan and China to supply wheat to Moldova as humanitarian aid or to sell it “at 
reasonable prices”. Then, the Parliament Decision was passed (31.07.2003) to exempt 
grain import to the country from VAT and the government authorization given to more 
than 60 economic entities to import grain. Official estimation of the wheat situation for 
the time when those decisions were taken can be seen in Table 14. 
Table 14 
Wheat Demand for Provision of Domestic Market for August 2003 – August 2004, 
thousand tons 
Demand for the period till 
August 2004 
including 
Crop 
2003 
Seed stock 
demand 
Potential 
volume of 
consumption  Total 
town village 
Deficit  import 
required 
101 58 43 450 158 292 -407 407 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry 
 
3.3. State regulation measures in the wheat, flour and bread markets 
 
The wheat failure, which has not happened for about half-a-century, limited volumes of 
the state wheat reserve and the progressive growth of domestic prices for flour and the 
product of prime necessity, – bread (see Graph 6), from the beginning of 2003, 
preconditioned the state intervention – by legal, economical and administrative ways, 
but proceeded from the realities of market economy.    
 
Graph 6. 
Evolution of Consumer Price Index for Wheat Flour and Bread in 2003 
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Source: DSS, Buletinul de preţuri, 2003 
 
As long as the state did not have any possibility (i.e. enough state reserves) to intervene 
in the grain market, the only way-out was to stimulate import of wheat into the country, 
and in extremely great volumes – no less than 200 thousand tons of bread wheat and 
100 thousand tons of fodder grain. Wheat and flour import of the previous years was 
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quite small (see Table 15). Reasoning from the appeared threat of failure to provide 
food security for the state, July 31 2003 Parliament of the RM adopted amendments and 
alterations to the article 3 of the Law on Carrying into Effect Title III of Tax Code” 
417-X III as of December 1997: “in August-December 2003 grain import of commodity 
items 1001, 1002 00 000 and 1003 00 100 in volumes agreed with the Government as 
well as its selling in the country territory are exempt from value added tax”.   
 
The Government Decision #1037 as of August 26 2003 approved quotas on grain 
import exempted from VAT: 500 thousand tons of wheat including 300 thousand tons of 
bread wheat, 20 thousand tons of barley for seeds and 10 thousand tons of rye. 
Regulation on Import and Selling of Grain with Preferential Tax Treatment was 
developed for implementation of the above mentioned decision. According to the 
Regulation only those enterprises that received proper certificates from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Ministry of Economy could import and sell grain during 30 days. 
 
It was originally assumed that the reason for issue of such an authorization would be apt 
price-quality ratio. There were even some directions like, for instance, the wheat with 
gluten of 18% should not cost more than 170 USD/ton. The Ministry of Agriculture 
expected that these types of criteria to add to the process of distribution of preferential 
grain quota a hue of competition, as it was required by the Government decision. 
However, soon it became clear that traders ‘do not hasten’ to participate in the bidding 
of “who is faster and cheaper”. Because wheat prices grew faster than the wheat supply 
was carried out, import conditions were “relaxed” and the Import Regulation was 
approved by the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Economy without mentioning threshold prices. 
 
Both the Parliament Decision on exemption of grain import from VAT and 
organizational measures of the Government resulted in more active supply of grain to 
Moldova. So during January-August, import of grain was 22.0 thousand tons including 
13.8 thousand tons of bread wheat, while in September-November – 73.1 and 67.1 
thousand tons respectively.   
 
However, there is another important aspect of the problem – price. On deciding to 
exempt grain supplies from VAT, the Government expected to eliminate current deficit 
of grain and, thus, to curb a possible rise of bread prices. Yet in reality the situation 
turned out to be different. The decision taken by Parliament limits the commodity 
(grain) price only when it “enters” the country, while it does not regulate selling inside 
the country. Then the following question is open: what selling prices will firms-
importers assign for imported grain? The bread wheat is not considered to be “a good of 
social importance” unlike flour and bread, for which a commercial markup is limited 
and controlled by the state in conformity with the Government Decision. Under these 
conditions, with grain deficit that lasted in the second half of 2003 and non-ordered 
normative basis, promotion of the imported wheat in the country territory remained out 
of the state control.     
 
Then, the following question arises: how positive was the influence on bread price from 
the exemption of grain import from VAT? As it is known that the product of grain 
processing – flour is liable to VAT at the rate of 20% and bread, a product produced of 
flour, is liable to VAT of 8% rate in conformity with the law. 
 
In order to estimate consequences of the decision made on wheat import exemption 
there were analyzed several schemes for the following line: a firm-importer of wheat – a 
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mill house – a bread-making plant. Estimates are made on the basis of data that are 
close to a real situation. The estimates show that, as a result of VAT imposing upon 
wheat import, cost price of one ton of wheat and flour remained unchanged: 225.6 USD 
per ton of wheat and 300.75 USD per ton of flour. For both cases a bread-making price 
at the plant remained the same: 396.99 USD including VAT – 66.16 USD. In both cases 
the budget received VAT of 52932 USD, however, under the current law, all 
responsibility to pay VAT to the budget fell on a mill house and the state will receive 
VAT to the budget only after the mill house sells the flour to the bakeries though the 
state could receive it immediately when the grain was imported.   
 
From the above one can make a conclusion that exempting firms-importers of bread 
wheat from VAT, the state has not received the expected result – retaining the bread 
price level but on the contrary prices go on rising, especially steeply in the mid-
November.   
 
A short time later, the crisis situation was reflected through the following events: 
 
1. The Government – the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry – together 
with project CNFA/USAID carried out an open discussion on situation in the 
grain market for agro-business experts on 13.11.2003. According to the 
estimates of the Ministry, “the situation is under control, prices will not rise till 
the end of the year”.  The basis for such an expectation were: import supply of 
42.4 thousand tons of bread wheat and 20.6 thousand tons of flour received by 
Moldova from September 1 to November 12; start of shipping of 10 thousand 
tons of wheat from Russia as humanitarian aid and a promise from China to 
render such aid to Moldova (1.0 thousand tons);  
2. Nevertheless, already on 15.11.2003 JSC “Franzelutsa” the major producer of 
bread in the country (55.2% of stocks owned by the state; the deputy minister of 
agriculture is the company’s board chairman) – suddenly announced about 30.0-
62.8% increase for all the types of bread except one (“Chisinau”, 0.8 kg – at the 
price of 2.75 MDL); 
3. On 19.11.2003 President of the RM demanded from the Government and 
authorities of JSC “Franzelutsa” reduction of the prices for three “social” types 
of bread down to their previous level and entrusted Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Center on Fight against Economic Crimes to control that cheap bread would 
not become an object of profiteering; 
4. The same day 19.11.2003 at the Government session there was taken a decision 
to decrease maximal commercial markup for bread and diary products sale from 
20% down to 10%; and there was created a special working group for working 
out measures on social protection of individuals with low-income. 
 
The measures taken eased, to a certain extent, “bread crisis” acuteness but as long as the 
grain and flour import price continued to grow, the cost price increased as well and 10% 
commercial markup did not cover expenses of shops for its selling – bread became 
unprofitable either for making or for selling.   
 
In the meantime, already in December it was clear that flow of wheat import to the 
country in spite of the undertaken measures decreased.  It was caused by wheat export 
restrictions introduced by Russia and Kazakhstan, a sharp rise of wheat prices, financial 
considerations of Moldovan firms-importers in light of increased expenses on purchase, 
transport, processing and storage of grain.   
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Graph 7 
Wheat Crisis: Warnings and Responses 
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At the end of 2003 in the country, according to the official estimate, there were 
approximately 30-35 thousand tons of bread wheat (at firms-importers and in the state 
reserve), and some more 15-20 thousand tons of grain, mainly of Class 5, in peasant 
farms.  
 
State reserve of bread grain was estimated at 16.0 thousand tons as of 1.01.2004 (18.0 
thousand tons – as of 1.01.2003). 
 
5. The following step was made on 24.12.2003: the Government addressed to the 
Parliament with a proposal: a) to extend till July 1 2004 the exemption of wheat 
import from VAT; b) to exempt from customs duty import of bread and forage 
wheat, barley and flour. Unlike the summer (31.07) VAT privileges for wheat 
import, this decision should touch those importers that import from the states 
with which Moldova has no free trade agreement. Next day, 25.12.2003, without 
any delay the Parliament approved in two readings the law proposed by the 
Government.   
 
Consequences of this decision are likely to show in full measure during the second 
quarter of 2004. Contrary to expectation, in January the wheat import reduced rather 
than increased and traders reoriented themselves to the flour import; this tendency will 
apparently linger during the next months. 
 
3.4. Dynamics and problems of wheat import 
Republic of Moldova after 1990, despite the production downfall in agriculture and its 
reorganization based on market, has never resorted to a large-scale import of wheat and 
flour. For instance, during 1994-2002 their import was quite modest (see Table 15)15. 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Except for the supply in 1995 of 75,0 thou of wheat and 100,0 thousand tons of barley based on the 
credit of the European Union (19,0 million ECU) and in 1994-1996 – based on grain credit of the US of 
30 million USD 
 30
Table 15 
Import of wheat and flour, thousand tons 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Bread grain 38,6 62,7 31,1 9,0 2,5 5,8 7,4 11,9 0,1 
Wheat flour 0 0 0 1,8 0,5 8,5 23,6 15,6 25,6 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Marketing 
 
Against this background, one could expect from the very beginning that the task set 
fourth by the Government for economic agents to import 500 thousand tons of wheat to 
the country, including 300 thousand tons of bread wheat would be very hard to fulfill, 
taking into account brevity of the term (less than a half a year!), private status of 
companies-importers (except for JSC “Moldresurse” and JSC “Franzelutsa”), as well as 
galloping monthly increase in prices for wheat in exporting regions. 
Table 16 
Import dynamics of wheat and flour, thousand tons 
 Jan. – 
Aug. 
Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. – Dec. 
(30.12.2003) 
Total wheat 22.0 9.4 19.5 44.2 28.9 124.0 
Including 
 Bread grain 13.8 8.4 16.1 42.5 28.9 109.7 
 Fodder grain 8.2 1.0 3.4 1.7 0.0 14.2 
 Wheat flour 7.6 2.6 12.6 11.5 6.7 41.0 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture 
 
According to the data of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry certificates for 
import of wheat were issued to the more than 60 economic agents, but only some of 
them made considerable use of the VAT exemption privilege. During the period from 
01.09.2003 to 30.12.2003 there were imported to the country 95.9 thousand tons of 
bread wheat, 6.0 thou t of fodder grain and 33.4 thou t of flour. The largest importers 
were: LTD Trans Oil - 12747 tons of bread wheat, National Agency of Material 
Resources – 7570 tons of bread wheat, G.T. Petru Tarlev - 7196 tons of bread wheat, 
791 t of fodder grain and 866 t of barley, Рicom - 6650 tons of bread wheat, SRL Tego 
Grup - 4948 tons of bread wheat, SRL Agrotera-Impex - 2358 tons of bread wheat and 
241 tons of fodder grain, JSC “Franzelutsa” - 8203 tons of bread wheat and 2264 tons 
of flour and JSC “Moldresurse” - 4999 tons of bread grain. Thus, the aforementioned 
eight companies imported to the country 52.3 thousand tons of wheat, or 51.3% of the 
total wheat import during September-December of 2003. 
 
Wheat flour import during September-December of 2003 was about 33.4 thousand tons. 
More than fifty companies imported flour and the largest quantities were imported by 
JSC “Franzelutsa”, SRL Unicaps, Triluna-UCAY and Danova-Prim. 
 
According to the data of the Ministry of Agriculture, the total import to Moldova of 
bread wheat and flour was 124 thousand tons and 41 thousand tons correspondingly. 
The main countries – exporters of wheat to Moldova in 2003 were Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Lithuania, while regarding flour – Russia, USA, Romania, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and 
Turkey. 
 
Grain resources that baking enterprises orient themselves to were mainly concentrated 
in 12 grain elevators out of 29 operating, including bread wheat of the state reserve – in 
grain elevators of Floresti (6.1 thousand tons), Causeni (5.1 thousand tons), Cahul and 
Comrat   (0.6 thousand tons), while regarding JSC “Franzelutsa” – in Edinet, Iargara 
and Drochia. 
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The import quota of 300 thousand tons of bread wheat till the end of the year approved 
by the Government was used by importers only by 1/2. The most probable causes of this 
are: 
• difficulties that grain-traders encountered in Russia and Kazakhstan and other 
markets related to purchase of necessary quantities if wheat at “acceptable 
prices”; 
• financial aspect – doubling of import prices for wheat as compared to the first 
half of the year; 
• increased expenditures on transportation, processing and storage of grain inside 
the country; 
• confidence that “for the sake of the population” the VAT exemption privilege 
will be prolonged after January 1, 2004. 
 
But the main cause consists of the following: there were missed the time and the most 
favorable prices for import of wheat and flour (see: Table 17). 
Table 17 
Development of Imports Prices for Wheat and Flour, USD/t 
 Jan. – Mar. May July Sept. Oct. Nov. 
Bread grain 90,9 – 105 119,7 152 198,5 212 210 
Fodder grain 69,9 84,5 130,4 154,4 166,6 165,4 
Wheat flour 154 – 182 211 – 232 240 330 364 363 
Source: Ministry of Economy 
 
As we can see, the circumstances were that during 1999-2002 Moldovan companies 
exported wheat for 70.9 – 88.2 USD/t. Moreover, even in the first half of 2003 the price 
had been 109.4 USD/t, while at the end of the current year it has already exceeded 200.0 
USD/t. 
 
Besides high initial producers’ price for wheat and transportation expenditures grain 
traders suffered additional costs inside the country as well (phytosanitary inspection, the 
State Inspection on Grain Products, railroad authorities). 
 
Wheat dispatched by the Russian Federation in form of humanitarian aid “at the 
expense of state reserves of the Russian Federation” – 10.0 thou t of bread wheat, the 
total value being 2.0 million USD - entered the Republic of Moldova during November-
December and are stored by the State Agency of Material Resources and Humanitarian 
Aid (JSC Cereale-Floresti, Ghindesti). A part of this humanitarian aid (600 tons) was 
transferred to Transnistrian authorities. 
 
3.5. Competitive Environment and Prices on the Bread Market 
 
Moldovan “bread sector” - which is flour and bread production and selling – has 
transformed from planning and distribution system, based on state and cooperative 
property (state association of 33 bread-making plants “Moldhleb” and concumer’s 
cooperation system “Moldcoop” – 112 bakeries), into a system operating according to 
the market rules and only partially (not more than by 15%) based on state property.  
 
Flour. Production capacity of flour-milling industry comes to about 40-43 thousand 
tons of flour per month. Since there are about 150 registered mills in the country (most 
of them private and only 3 - state-owned) – the situation in this sphere is quite 
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competitive, without monopolism. Relatively large mills are situated in Edinet, 
Chisinau, Orhei, Causani and Ceadir-Lunga. JSC “Franzelutsa” – the major producer of 
bread and macaroni – does not have its own flour mill facility. The population considers 
that the best quality flour is from Ceadir-Lunga where the mill, manufactured by a 
defense enterprise in 80’s, produces up to 80% of flour of extra and first-class quality. 
Output of first-class flour at small mills does not exceed 60-65%.   
 
Ratio between consumption of local and imported flour in Moldova for the first half of 
2003 was approximately 3:1 and for the second half year – 1:1. According to the 
Department of Statistics data in the year 2003 the price for wheat flour increased in 2.5 
times.  
 
Bread. In bread-making the situation in comparison with flour production is different: 
the state position remains quite strong while private sector is also presents. Now, there 
are 232 registered enterprises of this branch in the country (215 were active as of 
1.01.2003), their daily utilization is 500-520 tons of flour. 
 
There are bakeries in 35 towns including: in Chisinau – 17, their “efficiency” in some 
weeks was maintained by total availability of 2.7 up to 3.8 thousand tons of flour in 
their storage facilities.   
 
In spite of that the JSC “Franzelutsa” formally is not a monopolist on the bread market 
(does not produce more than 35% of total bread production - the limit for the 
monopolist - but only 15-17%) it has key economic and “political” position for the 
Government in bread price control, especially in the capital municipality where the 
population is over 700 thou people.   
 
Considering that JSC “Franzelutsa” supplies bread to more than 30 localities of the 
country, and unorganized bread taking-out is even greater, then we can conclude that 
this is the very enterprise that provides with bread not less than 20% of the population 
of Right-bank of the RM. It was JSC “Franzelutsa” advantage that it utilized wheat from 
the state reserves. Thus, despite the fact that in current June-October, a flour price in 
Moldova increased by 60%, “Franzelutsa” continued selling bread at the prices of 2001 
receiving additional grain from the state reserves. When the state grain reserve was used 
up the enterprise began operating in the red.  
 
Starting with June private bakeries that could not meet the price competition begun to 
close. Number of bakeries in the country decreased from 215 as of the beginning of the 
year to 158 (as of 1.07.2003), but increased to 177 by the end of the year. Only those 
private bakeries survived that had other types of business: either own shops or 
confectionery.  While the price of one kilogram of flour is 5 MDL, private bakeries sell 
bread at the price of 6.25 MDL/kg including transport and production expenses, taxes, 
salaries etc.  In conformity with the legislation, profitability of bakery production 
should not exceed 10% and its commercial mark-up – 10%.  
 
JSC “Franzelutsa” does not include expenses of bread delivery to shops in its bread 
price and in case of small consignments those expenses can make up to 7% of the cost. 
With 10% commercial mark-up for private shops this became “not trade but charity”.   
 
When “Franzelutsa” bread supply became troublesome, the number of clients of private 
bakeries increased.  Both small shops and supermarkets (“Green Hills”, “Cvint”, 
“Nr.1”) “filled up” their shelves with more expensive bread in order to satisfy a daily 
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demand. But private bakeries bread was more expensive because they bought flour at 
the market prices. JSC “Franzelutsa” uses flour from its own grain reserves and the 
most probably case will be that within the next few months the state will sell to JSC 
“Franzelutsa” flour from humanitarian grain at prices lower than the market ones. But 
there still will not be enough cheap bread for everyone. And, taking into account the 
limitation of commercial mark-up, shops will have to purchase more expensive bread 
from private bakeries. 
 
The bread situation in the country is not limited only by a confrontation between its 
major enterprise and private companies in the capital. In other towns the population is 
provided with bread by bakery plants, in villages by enterprises of MOLDCOOP and 
private mini-bakeries. Simple involvement of “administrative resource” will not settle 
the problem in this case.   
 
Bread situation – both for bakeries and the population – in the second half of 2003 
became much more complicated because of a drastic rise in flour prices. The flour price 
growth during the first six months, including in June – by 33.2% (see Table 19), was 
continued in July by 15.1%, in August – by 2.3 %, in September – by 6.8% and in 
October – by 8.3% and during the year as a whole in 2.5 times.   
 
Accordingly, prices for bread, by the estimate of Department of Statistics, increased in 
July by 6.1%, August – by 1.5%, September – by 2.9% and October – by 5.7% and 
during the year as a whole by39.8%; and population’s consumption of “bought” bread 
decreased by 12-15%.   
 
Monthly comparison of wheat flour and bread prices in 2002 and 2003 strikes even 
more (Table 18).   
 
Table 18 
Dynamics of Consumer Price Index for Wheat Flour and Bread  
in July-December 2003 (the same month of 2002 = 100%)  
 July August September October November December 
Flour 195.5 203.2 222.9 243.6 250.4 252.0 
Bread 118.2 120.4 123.9 131.1 136.7 139.8 
Source:  DSS, Buletinul de preţuri, 2003 
 
As it can be seen in Moldova during one year (from December to December) the wheat 
flour price increased in 2.5 times and for bread – by about 40%. We can assume that 
because of the increase in prices for imported wheat within the first half of 2004 the 
prices for flour and bread will go on rising in the future. It is quite probable that another 
part of bakery plants will cease their activities (by the middle of December 2003 there 
were 78 of such enterprises) and bread quality, especially “cheap one” – will decrease 
because of already applied practice of mixing high quality flour with flour made out of 
low-quality grain of class 4-5.        
 
Was it possible to foresee negative aspects of the current situation?  It was partly 
possible, in the opinion of V. Kutyrkin, who was a head of State Price Committee in 70-
80-s and then, for a decade, chairman of State Planning Committee of MSSR: 
“In our situation it is not only possible but necessary to regulate bread prices as bread is 
a mass consumption product of high social importance. First of all, a bread rate of 
profitability should be established. It is applied even in highly developed countries 
where bread producer may not receive more than 20% of profitability. In that case, 
today Moldovan bakeries would have produced 5-6 types of the cheapest mass bread 
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with profitability less than 20% and even with zero one for certain volumes. But then, 
they would have received a right to increase profitability for the rest of bread up to 30% 
and cover the losses suffered from production of cheap types of bread. This issue should 
be carefully considered in cooperation with producers. The tragedy is that only in 
Chisinau it is JSC “Franzelutsa” that satisfies main needs of the population for bread. At 
the periphery – e.g. Straseni, Calaras, Criuleni – this is done by the private bakeries. 
Then, what happened: some of producers, same “Franzelutsa”, hold up the prices for 
bread, suffering huge losses every day, being on the verge of bankruptcy, and the others 
sell bread at a new price and their bread is not purchased by poor ones. Suburban 
villages have rushed to Chisinau for cheap bread, “Franseluta” batches have raised, and 
losses have increased in direct proportion to the output increase, private bakeries are 
being closed – here is the tragedy. But this is, as they say, “a fire case”. Last year, we 
purchased wheat from producer at 60 bans. That was not too difficult to find 30-40 
million MDL in the budget to purchase bread grain and store it in the state reserve!  It 
would resulted in what we call a state intervention in economy. But the issue is not 
thought through strategically”16. 
 
4. Territorial Aspects of “Bread Problem” 
4.1. Chisinau: JSC “Franzelutsa” as a leader on the bread market 
 
Complication of a situation of bread provision for the Moldovan population for 
2003/2004 (autumn-spring) revealed that JSC “Franzelutsa” was not only the major in 
the country industrial producer of bread and bakery products but and the role it played 
in the state price policy and in bread provision for low income groups of the population.   
 
JSC “Franzelutsa” was established by integration of 4 state enterprises and on 
12.09.1995 it was registered with State Registry Chamber under the Ministry of Justice. 
Its authorized capital is 37450 thou MDL of which 55.2% is the state share. Main types 
of activities are the following: production of bread and bakery, biscuits, farinaceous 
foods and confectionery, retail trade of bread. The enterprise does not have its own mill 
facilities.  
 
The JSC “Franzelutsa” annually produces bread and bakery products at 64.0 thousand 
tons. Average daily volume of sales is 170-175 tons, its major part (160-165 tons) is sold 
in municipality Chisinau; besides, about 10-13 tons of bread is supplied to more than 30 
localities.   
 
Is JSC “Franzelutsa” a monopolist on the bread market?  If we take into account a 
formal criterion set by the Law on Protection of Competition - production of more than 
35% of a certain product at one enterprise - then it is not. As annual volume of bread 
consumption in the RM (without Transnistria) comes to 400-440 thousand tons and the 
share of JSC “Franzelutsa” does not exceed 15.0% (given production of 64.0 thousand 
tons).    
 
This may be concluded on the bases of the following estimates:  
• bread consumption, in accordance with the established rates, is determined at 
350 g/day which for the population of 3.6 million people makes up 
                                                 
16 On specifics of national price forming.  Kishinevsky Obozrevatel (Chisinau Observer), 4.12.2003 
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approximately 440 thousand tons (0.359 g * 3.6 millionlion * 30 days * 12 
months);  
• 38 thousand tons of grain are needed for monthly production of bread including 
28 thousand tons of bread wheat and 10 thousand tons of 5-class wheat. 
Considering the above, annual volume of grain required for provision of the 
state food security is 456 thousand tons (38 thousand tons * 12 months) 
including bread wheat – 336 thousand tons;  
• flour volume, made of 456 thousand tons of wheat comes to 334 thousand tons;  
• in accordance with the approved rates, 1 ton of flour is necessary to bake on 
average 1.30-1.35 tons of bread, and 334 thousand tons are enough for 440.9 
thousand tons of bread, i.e. the volume necessary to meet annual demand for 
bread of the RM (without Transnistria). 
 
Real conditions of the season 2003/2004 have already made some corrections into this 
scheme: for baking of bread, besides wheat, large quantities of flour are imported to 
Moldova; for some types of bread they use flour made of low-quality wheat; or apply 
different additives for bread-making etc.   
 
If we take into account that more than ½ of annual volume of bread in the country is 
made by rural population (54.7% of the population of the RM) then the share of JSC 
“Franzelutsa” in the total bread production volume exceeds 35% “indicator of 
monopolist”. And under the conditions when the controlling stock of the enterprise is in 
the state ownership and the enterprise get replenishment of grain from the state reserves, 
financial situation and price practice of this very economic entity in many respects 
determine stability on the country’s bread market. Meantime, by the end of 2003 
financial situation of JSC “Franzelutsa” reached its breaking point.   
 
For comparison we shall consider situation of this enterprise in a successful 2002 when 
the volume of net sales (without VAT) of the enterprise was 273.2 million MDL 
including: bread sales – 258.5 million MDL, or 94%. In 2002 cost price of 1 kg of bread 
was 3.23 MDL and selling price – 4.10 MDL (without VAT). Finally in 2002 net profit 
amounted to 22.2 million MDL or by 19.4% higher as compared with 2001.  
 
In 2003 the situation for the enterprise was differed. Financial results for the first six 
months were quite safe for JSC “Franzelutsa”. But, because of a rise in flour prices, 
results of 9 months already caused concerns (Table 19).     
Table 19 
Financial Results of JSC “Franzelutsa” for 9 Months of 2003  
Indicators 9 months of 2002  9 months 2003. 
Volume of net sales, thou MDL 1975457 226170 
Cost of sales, thou MLD 150824 194179 
Gross profit, thou MDL 46722 31990 
Profitability of sales, % 23.7 14.1 
Net profit, thou MDL 14101 74.0 
Net profit rate, % 7.1 0.03 
Source: DSS 
 
If for 9 months of 2002 net profit of JSC “Franzelutsa” was 14.1 million MDL and net 
profit rate of 7% (14101 : 197547) , then, according to the results of 9 months of the 
current year net profit of the enterprise was only 74.0 thou MDL and net profit rate of 
0.03%. Such a drastic decrease of profitability of the enterprise in the second half-year 
of 2003 happened because of a considerable rise in prices for flour and other 
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ingredients. If in 2002 the price of one ton of flour was on average 2030 MDL (1-class) 
and 1820 MDL (2-class), then by the end of November 2003 the price for flour 
increased almost twice. It was clear that if the enterprise would use for production flour 
at new higher prices (on average 4300 MDL per ton) and selling of JSC “Franzelutsa’s” 
bread in commercial shops would be carry out at the previous prices, bankruptcy would 
follow unavoidably.   
 
In the middle of November 2003 under this threat JSC “Franzelutsa” announced an 
increase in bread prices on average by 46% and for certain types from 30% to 63% 
(Table 20).    
 
Table 20 
Change of Prices for Bread Produced by JSC “Franzelutsa”, 17.11. 2003,  
                                                                                                 MDL 
Types of bread Old price New price Increase, % 
Orăşenească 2.15 3.25 51.2 
Snop 2.80 3.90 39.3 
Pâine albă pe vatră 2.10 3.10 47.6 
Plai 2.15 3.50 62.8 
Codru 2.15 3.40 58.1 
Pâine neagră cu prune 2.30 2.90 26.1 
Branişte 2.25 3.10 37.8 
Pâine neagră Columna 3.00 4.25 41.7 
Meleag 4.40 7.20 63.6 
Joc 2.40 3.40 41.7 
Bread rye fitness 2.50 3.75 50.0 
Bread Mais 3.80 5.60 47.4 
Twists 2.50 3.25 30.0 
 
Only for one type of bread - «Chişinău» (produced of flour of I and II class) – the price 
did not change – 2.75 MDL.   
 
Sudden increase of bread prices taken by JSC “Franzelutsa” by almost 50% gave rise to 
negative reaction of the population and opposition. The Government “expressed 
astonishment” at the actions taken by the enterprise, owned by the state (55.2% of 
stock) and it Board is chaired by the deputy Minister of Agriculture and Food Industry. 
In conformity with the recommendation of President of the RM (19.11.2003) JSC 
“Franzelutsa” returned previous “low” prices for 3 types of bread (“Chişinău, Codru” 
and “Alba”). By doing that, the shock of such a sharp increase in prices for “product of 
prime necessity” was eliminated; however social aiming of this solution – at the poorest 
– does not seem to be obvious. 
 
Financial aspect of this situation showed through total losses of JSC “Franzelutsa” in 
2003 amounted to 7.4 millionlion MDL due to rise in prices for wheat and the fact that 
weight of cheep and unprofitable production within the total volume of bread 
production made up 34.7%.   
 
In the framework of state regulation of prices and tariffs Government Decision #1385 as 
of November 20, 2003 was taken.  In accordance with this decision a commercial mark-
up for bread sold in shops decreased from 20 to 10% (till September 1, 2004). But this 
created problems for commercial establishments, because 10% mark-up for the price of 
JSC “Franzelutsa” bread did not cover their transportation and staff expenses. As a 
result, part of shops reduced requests for bread made by JSC “Franzelutsa”. Those who 
sell “cheap bread” have to deal with problems from the side of population (this type of 
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bread is still not enough) and with Center on Economic Crime Control that was 
entrusted with preclusion of all violations in trade of “cheap bread”. It is quite difficult 
to exercise such control taking into consideration that in Chisinau municipality there are 
1200 economic entities selling bread, 80% of which sell bread made by JSC 
“Franzelutsa”.  
 
In view of the fact that in Moldova according to the UNDP estimations over the 25% of 
population living under the line of extreme poverty and output of “cheap bread” makes 
only 5-7% of its production in the country, the question arises as to whether bread 
allowances should be (temporally) introduced for a number of categories of the 
population as they have been introduced e.g. in the area of electric power supply and 
rendering services of public utilities?  
4.2. Regional situation: Rural Area 
In contrast to towns with a network of more than 200 enterprises that produce bread, at 
present Moldova rural area inheres in self-provision with this “product of primary 
necessity”.  
 
There are private bakeries and enterprises of “Moldcoop” system in a number of large 
villages with the population of 7-12 thousand people. Many villages (private shops) 
purchase bread in neighboring towns – centers of raions. For all that, however, most of 
the bread consumed by rural population is made in their households.  
Graph 8 
Rural Households – Wheat Flour Consumption  
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Source: DSS, Households Budget Survey 
 
Self-provision of rural population with bread is based on the fact that after the land 
reform, 72.2% of agricultural land including 85.4% of arable land is privately owned.17  
Grain crops (wheat, barley, corn etc.) have recently occupied 63-69% of sown areas 
including winter wheat of 24-28% (see § 2.2., Table 5). Main part of land owned by 
peasants (not less than 2/3) is granted on lease and is used by tenant enterprises (LTD 
companies, joint stock companies, producers’ co-operatives and associations of 
peasants’ forms) as well as by tenant “leaders” for production of agrarian products for 
                                                 
17 Anuarul statistic al Republicii Moldova, 2002. p. 321 
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sale. The predominant form of the land leasing charge is in-kind payment (80%), 
including grain. 
 
At present, about 40% of areas under grain crops are concentrated in agricultural 
enterprises of a new type, many of which work on large tracts of land leased from 
peasants, however, the major part of those areas are in peasants’ farms (see § 2.2., Table 
7). After 2000, big enterprises have become main producers of grain (wheat, barley) for 
export whilst peasants’ farms keep most part of the crop (of wheat and especially corn) 
for utilization in their own households.     
 
How great are the rural population’ grain reserves?  There are various estimates done by 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Economy and Institute of Field Crops Breeding 
(Balt). For the year 2002 these estimates were within 150-200 thousand tons of wheat, a 
bit higher for corn – mainly for cattle and poultry fodder. Lean year of 2003 reduces 
these estimates to 15-20 thousand tons. The main part of rural households’ wheat and 
flour reserves are those stored out of previous year crop. Along with that, they 
replenished their grain and flour reserves from a new crop. But how big are these 
volumes?    
 
We have applied, as indicative information, the results of sociological survey of 345 
peasants – land-owners and 302 entrepreneurs - land tenants. The survey was carried out 
within the period of November 14-28 2003, in 302 villages located in all 32 raions and 
ATU of Gagauzia including 115 villages in Northern zone, 86 villages - in Central zone, 
and 101 in the Southern zone of the RM. The survey was implemented in the 
framework of the study “Lease of Agricultural Land”, that was realized by CIRS on 
USAID/PFAP initiative.   
 
Both peasants (land-owners that let it on lease) and tenants that utilize the land were 
asked about 30 questions on conditions and results of their work on the land. In the 
questionnaire, among other questions, there was the following one for a peasant that let 
his land on lease:  
«A. 11. What is the size of payment for a plot of land? 
1. Money ________ lei, 
2. Wheat ________ kg, 
3. Corn ________ kg, 
4. Barley __________ kg, 
5. Sunflower __________ kg, 
6. Other (indicate) ___________________ .» 
 
Results of the processing of data regarding the land leasing charge with wheat to 
peasants are shown in Table 21. As one can see, out of 345 households 303 received 
wheat in the form of payment for land lease, 42 or 12% - did not.  Minimal size of 
“payment with wheat ” – 15 kg, maximal – 1500 kg.  
For the sake of control, a similar question was set in a questionnaire for a tenant (either 
an enterprise or a “leader” – an individual). Out of 302 interviewed tenants 28 or 9.3% 
did not give out wheat as payment for land lease to peasants. 274 leaders (90.7%) gave 
it at the size of: minimum 12 kg, maximum 1200 kg.   
Table 21 
Amount of wheat received by peasants as payment for the land lease 
Number of peasants Wheat received, kg 
persons % 
Min/Max, kg 
Less than 50 31 9.0 15 
From 51 to 150 62 18.0 - 
From 151 to 300 86 24.9 - 
More than 300 124 35.9 1500 
Did not get any wheat 42 12.2 - 
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Table 22 
Amount of wheat, given by tenants to peasants as payment for the land lease 
Number of tenants Wheat received, kg 
persons % 
Min/Max, kg 
Less than 50 20 6.0 12 
From 51 to 150 46 15.2 - 
From 151 to 300 82 27.2 - 
More than 300 126 41.7 1200 
Did not get any wheat 28 9.3 - 
 
Total volume of wheat, received by the group of 302 peasants, made up 91721 kg or on 
average per one household – 298.8 kg. A similar to the above result was received after 
processing the information for tenants: according to these data, they gave out in the 
form of payment for lease on average by 313.7 kg of wheat per each land-owner (out of 
302 land-owners). 9.3% of tenants paid in another form – with money, or corn and 
sunflower etc. Minimal and maximal amounts of given wheat are also similarly 
estimated by both peasants and the tenants.  
 
Information by zones: in the North the payment with wheat was the lowermost – 12.7% 
of peasants did not get it at all and only 1/3 of those who received the wheat got more 
than 300 kg, the rest – less; in Central and South zones more than a half of the 
households received over 300 kg.    
 
In situation of bad harvest of 2003 there were cases when payment for land lease was 
made in the form of wheat, imported from CIS countries (Ukraine, Russia or 
Kazakhstan) on the initiatives of mayors of villages or tenant leaders.  Peasants 
themselves insisted on it in cases when their contracts on land lease contained a 
wording that payment would be made in the form of wheat.   
 
General conclusion: major part of bread in rural areas is made at home; in rural areas 
most of households have wheat and flour, however, in lesser volumes than in previous 
years.  Their want is compensated, as a rule, by consumption of corn meal and grain 
legumes (kidney beans, peas) and potatoes.  
 
4.3. Measures launched by administration of Transnistria  
 
Food security of Transnistrian Region of Moldova beginning from 1990 is provided by 
its administration separately both on the base of the internal resources and at the 
expense of growing food import, especially in recent years. Present situation in 
Transnistrian agriculture which was profitable before (fertile soil, 48% of soil was 
watered) is characterized as critical. Loss of markets, breaking off with Right-bank 
branch of production, debts and lack of working assets, necessary equipment and as a 
result the reduce of cultivated areas, increasing number of unprofitable businesses and 
reducing of market of agrarian sector take place. In 90’s gross output of agricultural 
products was reduced by 70%.  
 
Beginning from the middle of 90’s attempts of reforming of the agrarian sector and its 
readjustment to the market conditions have been made, including on the basis of the 
“Concept of the Reforming of Transnistrian Agro-Industrial Complex” worked out by 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Presidents Decree on “Further Reforming of 
Agricultural and Processing Enterprises of Transnistrian Agro-Industrial Complex”. 
According to these documents the reforming of collective property into collective-
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shared one by means of allotting collective farmers and collective-farm pensioners with 
material and landed share takes place. It is confirmed by giving the certificate and 
formation of cooperative agricultural enterprises on a voluntary basis.       
 
Besides the State Reserve Fund (15% of total agricultural land) was created, to insure 
the allotment of land to those who want to start farming. It is stipulated that from 30 to 
200 hectares of agricultural land apiece can be given to a farmer. 
 
Thus in spite of the fact that according to the Constitution of Transnistria the land is the 
state ownership and the question concerning private land ownership hasn’t been settled 
yet. The referendum due to low population attendance was declared abortive. But the 
Land Code passed in 2002 has in fact settled this problem: citizens enjoying rights of 
property for land shares (land plots) can sell, bestow or bequeath them.18 
 
As Transnistria is densely settled and is marked by the lack of land resources (0.41 ha of 
agricultural land per person and 0.33 ha of arable land) the efficiency of their use is 
quite important. Both the criteria of the efficiency – the minimal level of crop capacity 
of cultivated land (wheat – 25 c/ha, barley – 20 c/ha, corn – 30 c/ha) and the 
responsibility of farmers for irrational use of land through fine sanctions and, as 
extreme measures, confiscation (total or partial) of the irrationally used land19 has 
established legally. It is regulated that newly created peasant farm is exempted from 
land tax in the following way: 1st year – 100%, 2nd year – 75% and 3rd year – 50%.20 
Though because of the depressive state of agrarian sector, lack of the farm yield 
insurance system, the majority of farmers hold the opinion that farming isn’t a 
profitable activity, and this is the reason of rejection of land and return it to the state. 
This problem is partially settled for cooperative agricultural enterprises by creating the 
concerns for production of grain and industrial crops. Nowadays there are 3 such 
concerns: “Ribnitskii”, “Benders” and “Tiraspolskii”, which were created on the basis 
of integration of 3 bread-baking plants and cooperative agricultural enterprises. Within 
the concerns frames long-term contracts between participants are concluded. On their 
basis technological charts for joint production are made. According to these charts the 
bread-baking plants provide the farms with seed material, fuel, fertilizer and pesticides. 
The contract also presupposes the quotas for the yield to be divided among the parties 
depending on the grain growing and harvesting expenses. In the year of 2002 which is 
considered as a good one the enterprises incorporated in these concerns supplied more 
than 90 thousand tons of grain to the “centralized funds”.  
 
It is expected that the State Programme of Reforming and Developing of Agro-
Industrial Complex will be adopted in 2004. Specially created joint committee will 
evaluate the state of each farm (there are about 100 farms in the region). They will be 
distinguished into three groups: for successful ones the debts will be frozen and 
restructured; to others “not hopeless” the debts will be written off thus giving the 
possibility to develop; the others will be declared as bankrupts and will be offer for sale 
for symbolic price. The enterprises processing agricultural products - canneries, and 
meat-dairy are included in the program of privatization. Bread-baking plants are not 
subjected to privatization. 
 
Unrecognized status of the TMR and 14 years of experience of “fight for survival” force 
the administration of the region to control and to regulate strictly the problems of food 
                                                 
18Transnistrian Land Code, p. 36 
19 Regulation, concerning rational use of agricultural lands, 14.12.2000 
20 The Law about land payment , p.6 (у) 
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self-sufficiency and supply of the population with food products and first of all with 
bread throughout the whole period of autonomous development. For this reason are 
greatly changed both the structure of sowing land in favor of grain and industrial crops 
and the structure of grain growing based mainly on the production of winter wheat. 
Table 23 
Transnistria: production of grain crops 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Grain crops – total 
   Sowing areas, thou ha 96.9 83.7 86.7 83.0 91.3 
   Gross yield, thou ton 246.8 171.7 134.2 194.4 201.8 
   Yield capacity, c/ ha 25.5 20.5 15.5 23.5 22.1 
   of which:      
Winter wheat 
   Sowing areas, thou ha 49.1 50.4 50.8 48.4 57.2 
   Gross yield, thou ton 152.8 124.6 88.0 133.2 141.3 
  Yield capacity, c/ha 31.1 24.7 17.3 27.5 24.6 
Barley (winter and spring)  
   Sowing areas, thou ha 26.3 20.5 19.3 16.0 21.1 
   Gross yield, thou ton 55.1 32.2 22.4 36.5 42.4 
 Yield capacity, c/ha 21.0 15.7 12.3 22.7 20.1 
Corn for grain 
  Sowing areas, thou ha 17.2 8.5 12.6 12.5 8.0 
   Gross yield, thou ton 33.7 11.0 19.2 16.7 12.7 
  Yield capacity, c/ ha 19.6 13.0 15.2 13.4 16.0 
Source: Statistical Annual of TMR, Ministry of Economy, Tiraspol, 2003, pp. 108-109 
There is a strict state control over the prices for grain, flour and bread products in the 
region. Regulation on Transnistrian Price Formation approved by Presidential Decree 
establishes the regulating mechanism, order of formation and applying the prices 
(tariffs) on products for production and technical purposes, agricultural products, 
medicine and medical products, oil products and coal, consumer goods, and services 
both domestic and imported, regardless of the source of currency means (for centralized 
allocated currency or own currency means), or bought on the conditions of 
consignations, on the exchange of commodities (barter), or bought by other means and 
also on products sold to and from the Fund of State Needs.21 
 
There are two kinds of regulated prices: fixed by the president of Transnistria (prices 
for grain crops - wheat, rye, barley – and seeds) and prices fixed by ministries, 
departments and administrations of towns (districts) – sale prices for flour for baking 
and sale and retail prices for bread and bakery products (fixed by Ministry of Economy 
in coordination with the interested ministries and departments). The control over 
regulated prices is carried out by the joint committee of prices and tariffs and Ministry 
of Economy. 
 
But the system is unnecessarily bureaucratized. Three different notional prices for 
products are used in the regulated price system: the fixed price, the threshold price and 
the declarative price. Regulated price – the price which can vary from basis level 
according to the rules established by state. The fixed price – state regulated price of firm 
established value. Threshold price, limited by a certain sizes which are established by 
the state authorities, the sale price may be low than the limit but not more than it. 
                                                 
21 the order of Resolution of Price Formation Regulation in Transnistria, 13.07.2001 
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Purchase Price – the price on which the state bought the products for state needs, it is 
formed by joint committee. Purchase prices as a rule are established on the higher level 
than average one in the internal market (for example, all the expenditures related to its 
purchasing bearing by the importer both on the territory and abroad are covered when 
the products is imported for state needs at the expenses of the republican budget). 
 
Maintaining rather low level of cost value (used as a basis for fixing of regulated prices 
for domestic goods) produced grain, flour and bakery products is achieved due to the 
fact that agricultural enterprises are exempted from tax on volumes of sales and the 
flour-and-cereals plants are taxed by 3% rate, besides the sold fuel and lubricant 
materials are exempted from excises and customs duties.  
 
The regulation establishes the threshold for profitableness to full cost value on: 
• Flour for bread baking: wheaten of top-quality and high-grade – 10%, wheat flour 
and all purpose unbleadged and second grade– 5%, rye sowing and rye flour – 5%; 
• Bread and bakery from: wheaten flour of top quality – 15%, wheat flour of high-
grade – 10%, wheat flour and all purpose unbleadged and second grade - 5%, rye 
sowing flour and rye flour and their mixture – 5%, bakery – 25%. 
 
Commercial mark-up for sold bread and bakery consists of about 20%. Thus state 
purchases may be considered as indirect state subsidies both from the point of view of 
local agricultural producers and its importers.   
 
According to the Ministry of Agriculture of Transnistria estimations the region’s annual 
need in grain is about 60 thousand tons.22 During last 5 years regardless of weather 
changes Transnistria managed to provide this minimum also due to the strict state 
regulation including annual state purchases of agricultural products. Beginning from 
1997 the state purchases are made on the basis of advance funding through technical 
credits against the delivery of food grain.  
 
In the years which are considered for agriculture as difficult ones the strict requirements 
to the state purchases supplemented by administrative sanctions. For example in 2000 
the Government Decision on “Purchases of agricultural and food products for the state 
needs in 2000” established for each raion: assortment and state purchase amount, 
including 60 thousand tons bread grain 90% of which should be bread wheat.  
 
The deliveries of products under state contract were realized against of the enterprises’ 
debts accumulated in 1997-1999. Additionally, the Ministry of State Security and State 
Customs Committee based on the presidential decree on “Additional measures to 
prevent illegal import of grain and grain products” organized day-and-night work 
during harvesting in order to prevent “illegal export” of grain and grain products outside 
Transnistria. And at the same time, in case of exigency, machinery for harvesting from 
the right-bank Moldova has been using on the basis of contracts.  
 
Negotiations on the purchasing bread wheat abroad were initiated at the beginning of 
May 2003 when the grain issues were examined by the region’s Supreme Council. The 
contracts on the delivery of 35 000 tons of bread wheat from Russia, Baltic countries, 
Belarus, and Kazakhstan were concluded. The purchases were made at the expense of 
the state budget and the delivery of grain began from August 2003. Own resources 
(yield of 2003) make up 16.4 tons of wheat. 
                                                 
22 Olvia-press, 25.06.2002 
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In spite of all taken measures in Transnistria like in Moldova the stable upward trend of 
bread prices is observed in recent years. Truth to say, practically till the middle of 2001 
the low - as compared with the Moldova and nearest Ukrainian districts - prices for 
bread maintained in Transnistria due to the strict state regulation both prices for state 
purchased of grain and flour for baking and retail prices for bread and bakery products. 
The price of bread produced from flour from the state fund was about 1.5 MDL but the 
price for so called “commercial bread” was up to 3 MDL.  
 
In 1998-2000 the bread prices regulation was “supported” by introduction of buying 
limits: not more than 2 kg of bread and 0.5 kg of bakery products per person showing 
the passport confirming local registration and strengthening customs control in order to 
prevent the exportation of bred outside Transnistria. Though after relative smoothing of 
prices by the end of 2001 (the average price for 1 kg of bread – about 3 MDL) such 
measures weren’t practiced by the region’s administration. 
The prices for the main sorts of bread were unchangeable till May 2003 in spite of the 
fact that as early as in February 2003 it became clear that the own yield of wheat in the 
region will be extremely weak. Than the first rising of bread price took place on 
20.06.2003. Depending on the demand and sort of the bread the price varied: the price 
of loafs rose by 23%, high-grade bread – by 13%, and bread of high grade and second 
grade - by 7%. In July the bread price rose again - about 11% more in comparison with 
June price and by 27% in comparison with prices at the beginning of 2003. It was 
specially mentioned that state regulation of bread prices concerned only bread produced 
of flour from the state fund. Private producers of bakery products could establish the 
level of profitability and the price on their products by themselves.23 Such sudden 
changes of prices led to the increasing demand of urban and rural population on flour.  
 
To smooth the differences in prices for flour and bread in different districts of 
Transnistria and to ensure the “state bread supply” to all districts the state store of flour 
is kept on bread-baking plants in Bender, Tiraspol and Rybnitsa. The rest districts of 
Transnistria are “attached” to one of these plants.  
 
Evaluating the possibility of further upward trend in prices the Ministry of Economy 
considers that “the prices for bread in Transnistria won’t go up sudden, even if the price 
for 1 tone increases to USD 150.24 At last another rising of bread prices took place in 
November after which the average bread price is about 5 MDL (the cheapest bread in 
Tiraspol costs 4 MDL and the most expensive one in Rybnitsa costs about 6 MDL). 
From the point of view of region’s administration the prices for bread and bakery 
products “are almost stabilized” and the state’s reserves of grain and flour would be 
enough for regular supply of Transnistrian population with bread and bread products 
during 7 months i.e. till a new harvest.  
 
5. Bread prices shocks and the poor 
If one defines food security as such state of the country’s economic system when every 
citizen’s access (both physical and economic) to the minimal consumer basket is stably 
provided for, then based on the fact that in the Republic of Moldova, according to the 
estimate of the Ministry of Economy and UNDP-Moldova (Poverty and Policy 
Monitoring Unit)25, 40.4% of the population is below the poverty line, including 26.2% 
- below the extreme poverty line, which essentially means biological survival, it 
becomes evident that the country has no such economic system. 
                                                 
23 Olvia-press 18.06.2003 
24 Olvia-press 04.06.2003 
25 Strategia de creştere economică şi reducere a sărăciei (2004-2006), Guvernul RM, 2003, p. 13 
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The poor spend the major part of their incomes for food. Based on Moldova’s 
household budget surveys there can be distinguished 4 the most vulnerable social 
groups to bread prices growth: families with many children; families with one parent 
and lone persons; families with unemployed parents; certain categories of pensioners. 
These groups as compared to the total population are in the worse situation as regards 
incomes, consumption and nutrition. It is this part of the population living below the 
poverty line that suffers the most any rise in prices for food and services included in the 
minimal basket of goods, as well as inflation. Despite the fact that there has been a 
recent tendency of the share of expenditures for food decreasing within the available 
income of the total Moldovan population: from 69% (Q4 of 1999) to 57% (Q4 of 2003); 
20% of the poorest persons spend 60% of their available income for buying foodstuffs. 
 
And it is natural since the need of food (nutrition energy) is the first and foremost need 
of a person. On this account almost all approaches to determining the poverty line 
applied in practice are bound to the food need. A rather considerable part of the dietary 
intake of the poor represents the “bread and bakery” group of goods while consumption 
of meat, fish, eggs and milk is limited. Given the daily norm established by the FAO for 
countries with warm climate of about 2100 calories and the actual average consumption 
of about 1800 calories in Moldova, under estimates of the UNDP-Moldova no less than 
10% of the country’s population consume less than 1500 calories, which is defined as 
malnutrition. 
 
In 2003 according to the DSS estimates Moldova experienced 19.5% rise of the cost of 
minimal basket of goods; inflation rate was 15.7%. As compared to rise in prices for 
nonfood goods and services prices for foodstuffs grew to the utmost over the last year. 
The trend of the bread prices increase that has intensified after stopping of the state 
subsidies in the mid-90’s continued in 2003 through rise in prices for bread by a yearly 
average of 15.5% and by the end of the year (December as compared to the December 
of 2002) – by 39.8%. As a result, if average monthly income per capita allowed in 1995 
buying 65.4 kg of white bread, in 2000 it was 43.9 kg and in 2003 – even less than 40.0 
kg. Correspondingly, according to the DSS data, per capita retail sales of bread and 
bakery reduced three times over that period26. 
Graph 9.  
Price Evolution during 2000 – 2003 
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Source: Annual Price Bulletins for 1999-2002, Monthly Price Bulletins for 2003, CISR calculations 
 
                                                 
26 Anuarul statistic al Republicii Moldova, DSS, 2002, p. 468 
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As the Graph 10 shows, the group belonging to the two poorest quintiles suffered bread 
prices growth the most; share of the bakery being the largest within its dietary intake. 
And, first of all, these are people living in small towns. 
Graph 10.  
Average Monthly Bread Consumption during 1999-2003 
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Source: DSS, Household Budget Survey 
 
The bread prices increase in Q4 of 2003 mostly made the poorest urban population (1 
quintile) consume less bread, which is a circumstantial evidence of the fact that the 
current social support system did not work well in this case, and the “social”, cheap 
bread is consumed not only by those for whose sake this low price is being maintained. 
 
According to the household budget survey data the trend that began to show during 
2001-2002 of bread, flour, groats, etc. decreasing their share within the total household 
food expenditures did not develop in 2003. For all that nominal food expenditures 
increased and per capita consumption of these products decreased. 
Graph 11  
Dynamics of average monthly food expenditures during 1999-2003 
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Source: DSS, Household Budget Survey, CISR calculations   
 
Given the today’s rather low marketability of agricultural production the impact that 
bread price changes have upon the poor differ depending on their position on the food 
market: some of them are net producers and some are net consumers. Thus, more than 
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92.8% of urban inhabitants’ incomes of Moldova are being made up of wages and social 
allowances, while more than 50.7% of household incomes in rural areas come from 
their employment in the agriculture. Starting from these circumstances the most difficult 
situation is now, after prices for bread have risen for residents of small towns (circa 
400.0 thou persons), which household incomes from agricultural activities does not 
exceed 20.0%, which means the buffer of own agricultural production does not work in 
food provision, the unemployment rate is high and prices for bread are higher than in 
municipalities of Chisinau, Baltsi and rural areas. 
 
In rural areas, as the sociological research of 302 villages revealed (see § 4.2.), most 
people have reserves of wheat and corn. This is being confirmed by the data of 
household budget surveys. Thus, in Q4 of 2003 when, in fact, prices for bread and other 
wheat products grew, the cost of home-made wheat flour per one household member, 
even for the poorest strata of the population (1st quintile) was practically equal to 
expenditures for their purchase. That is why situation of the non-poor rural residents 
after the prices increased will mostly remain being rather stable in the nearest future, 
while situation urban “risk groups”, as it especially refers to small towns, will be close 
to being critical. 
 
While evaluating the food security of the poorest population strata, one should take into 
consideration that this issue does not derive from the situation the country’s agro-
industrial sector is in solely. It can be corrected through resources arriving from outside. 
But this requires an efficient social service of food support for those categories of 
citizens. The lack of such system causes humanitarian food aid received by the country 
to miss those who are really in need. The lack of transparency during the distribution of 
this food is one of reasons the corruption lingers. Besides, distribution of humanitarian 
food aid flows results in the fact that their main part accumulates in the most financially 
well-off region – the municipality of Chisinau. 
 
The population of the Chisinau municipality, given all the socio-political importance of 
the capital centre, cannot be considered the most indigent group of the population from 
the economic point of view (as regards incomes). Therefore, administrative decision 
binding JSC “Franzelutsa” to produce no less than 1/3 of “cheap bread” and sell it at 
prices lower than the market ones is rather a paternalist action undertaken as a “prompt 
reaction” to the November 2003, bread prices rise. Economic consequences of such 
decision for JSC “Franzelutsa” are evident: losses of 12 million MDL over the 2nd half 
of 2003 and debts to creditors and suppliers of 70.0 million MDL (as of 1.01.2004). The 
possible losses of the enterprise in 2004 could be even higher. Thus, the attempt to limit 
bread prices administratively (budget restrictions does not allow introduction of 
subsidies) not only failed to stabilize the provision of the poorest with bread at 
considerable prices, but also created a real possibility of the situation getting worse in 
the nearest future. 
 
How can state help the poor when the bread prices are growing? Experience of other 
countries demonstrates different forms of state regulation in such situation: general food 
price subsidies, food distribution policies, food rations, food/ ration cards and 
mechanisms of supplementary food supply. These measures can be used both to 
increase real incomes of direct beneficiaries and can provide safety to the poor against 
reduction of their real incomes. 
 
A better targeting of state support to the poor is possible when the Government knows 
where the poor live or what social groups require state support most of all. Since 
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Moldova has no pronounced food distress regions the Government’s attention should be 
paid first of all to certain social groups during the decision-making on support due to the 
bread price increase. The special working group to elaborate some measures in order to 
protect persons with low income has been created by the Government (19.11.2003) as 
reaction to bread prices increase, but the proposals of this group are unknown. 
 
The solution apparently should be searched for through temporary (till the new yield) 
introduction of targeted compensations for the poor. If assess the November decision on 
the “cheap bread” based on three criteria: “coverage” (share of the poor receiving the 
“cheap bread”), “targeting” (share of the “cheap bread” delivered to the poor) and 
“efficiency” (share of expenditures for buying the “cheap bread” within the total 
expenditures of poor households), one could conclude that production of such bread, 
though having positive public echo, does not fully solve the bread problem for the 
critically vulnerable groups of the population. 
And so, in case no decision on targeted compensations for the poor is made due to any 
reasons, and the practice of producing the “social bread” is further maintained, it is 
expedient at least to provide a better targeting of its distribution: a) risk groups – 
families with many children, the elderly and invalids (based on coupons issued by 
regional bodies of the National House of Social Insurance); b) to specialized institutions 
– medical, social, military, penitentiary, etc. 
 
The food security can be, and have to be provided not only through efforts of state 
bodies alone. Private sector forming more than 70% of GDP (DSS, 2003) has also to 
take part in increasing resources and stabilizing prices for bread grain, flour and bread. 
In order for this to realize the state should create a competitive environment adequate to 
the market both in production and internal trade, as well as in external trade operations 
on the grain market. 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
The situation that has developed in Moldova due to the corn failure in 2003 and 
threatens now food security is a result of a series of objective and subjective factors. 
The first, objective factors showed through extremely unfavorable climate conditions 
(winterkilling of most winter crops, dry spring and first half of the summer-time) and 
unfinished reformation of agriculture – the collapse of large collective enterprises and 
the sector’s infrastructure was not accompanied by an adequate strengthening of market 
relations based on private ownership of land and means of agricultural production. The 
second, subjective reasons are characterized by the lack of proper efficient and 
professional actions of state bodies and economic agents bound to predict the situation 
and forestall its eventual negative consequences. 
 
Traditionally, the Republic of Moldova is a country that satisfies its requirements for 
bread grain thanks to domestic production. Even during the transitional period, from a 
planned to market economy, Moldova’s yearly grain production was about 1.0 million 
tons, including 1991-1995 – 1062.2 thousand tons and 1996-2002 – 951.8 thousand tons 
on average. One of the peculiarities of this period is that grain, including bread grain, 
became an important export item of Moldova. Thus, in the bumper-crop year of 2002, 
grain export was 376.7 thousand tons of the total value of 25.5 million USD or 1/3 of 
the total yearly crop production export. Bread grain and flour were imported during that 
period in limited amounts, mainly high-quality brands for improving the quality of 
bread. Thus, grain import in 2000 was 7.4 thousand tons, in 2001 – 11.9 thousand tons, 
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in 2002 – 0.1 thousand tons, and flour – 23.5, 15.6 and 25.6 thousand tons 
correspondingly. 
 
2003 turned out to be extremely unfortunate for grain crops due to weather conditions. 
The total yield of bread grain made up only 101.5 thousand tons, while 50-80 thousand 
tons is needed for seed-stock and circa 400.0 thousand tons – for food. For the first time 
in the last fifty years there emerged a necessity to import large volumes of wheat and 
flour. The situation has been additionally aggravated by the strained international grain 
market during the year of 2003/2004 – its world production decreased to 561.9 million 
tons, trading volume – down to 96.5 million tons and reserves – down to 128.3 million 
tons. Many European countries, including those adjoining Moldova – Romania and 
Ukraine – suffered heavy losses of grain due to the drought. Beginning in the spring of 
2003 prices for grain and flour on the international market started to increase quickly 
and doubled over the year. 
 
The threat that had emerged for the country’s food security required state intervention in 
the form of legal, economic and administrative actions. Analysis of these actions – with 
reference to the specific situation of 2003 and based on the experience of the transition 
period as a whole allow one to draw some generalizations and recommendations. 
 
1. Legislation, institutions and economic mechanisms providing for the food security of 
the Republic of Moldova did not develop into a uniform system. Their 
incomprehensive and uncoordinated nature as refers to the situation of 2003 have 
shown insufficient state grain reserves, lack of an intervention fund, inefficient 
monitoring of the situation on external grain markets, slow reaction of state bodies 
to adjust the taxation of the wheat and flour import, of state bread prices regulation, 
including accordance of targeted compensations and humanitarian aid to the most 
indigent strata of the population.  
 
2. Actions of state bodies during the crisis situation of 2003 were not anticipatory or 
optimal from an economic point of view. At the same time, most Central and Eastern 
European countries, including Romania and Ukraine, since the spring of 2003 have 
made anticipatory actions: banning export and introducing preferential treatment of 
bread grain and flour import, purchasing large amounts of wheat on external market, 
using resources of intervention grain funds to stabilize the bread prices situation. 
Real actions of the Moldovan state bodies to attract wheat to the country in the form 
of humanitarian aid (from Russia, Kazakhstan and China) were made only in the 
mid-2003, and those to stimulate grain import (its VAT exemption) – only after the 
August of 2003 when prices for grain had already become high and Russia and 
Kazakhstan, the main potential grain exporters to Moldova, had introduced customs 
and administrative restrictions to its exports. 
 
As a result, the goals to import no less than 300 thousand tons of bread wheat to the 
country and hold internal prices for bread in position set by the Law #356-XV of 
31.07.2003 on exemption of the grain import of VAT during August-December of 
2003 failed to materialize. Effectiveness of the broadening of benefits that has 
followed (Law #568-XV of December 25, 2003) – exemption of the import of bread 
and fodder grain, fodder barley and wheat flour of VAT and customs duty – was 
weakened to some degree by further rise in prices on regional and international 
grain markets and all this made the wheat import to Moldova less-profitable.  
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3. Inadequate reaction of state bodies to the emerging and growing “bread crisis” 
during 2003 is due to inefficient monitoring of the condition of the regional grain 
market, lack of state grain and flour resources sufficient for price intervention, lack 
of approved methods of food protection of the poor. Concurrently, market 
mechanisms and competition on the grain market were underused and the 
capabilities of administrative measures to settle the “bread crisis” were 
overestimated, which has negatively affected the business environment both related 
to the grain market and bread production. 
 
4. Based on the year 2003 experience, it is important not only to consider the current 
situation critically, but to establish structure and order of both immediate and 
middle-term actions to ensure food security. 
Actions in the nearest term are mainly socially oriented, as follows: 
a) introducing temporary, till July 1, 2004, bread compensations for some 
categories of the population with low incomes (elderly, families with many 
children, invalids). Funds for this task can be found through both grants from 
international organizations and stopping state support of the “cheap bread” 
production by JSC Franzelutsa that is not oriented well at the poorest part of 
consumers; 
b) starting utilization of a special social insurance fund a little earlier than 
envisaged by the pensions indexation budget (1.04.2004); 
c) setting a minimum wage increase for state officials, workers of health care, 
education, culture according to the bread price increase and recommending 
private structures to provide for a similar raise for their workers; introducing 
a scholarship increase for students of high and higher schools pro rata to the 
bread price increase. 
 
Besides this, in the production sphere it is expedient to: 
a) examine economic expediency of further maintaining the monopolistic 
situation of JSC “Franzelutsa” on the bread market or its breakdown into 3-4 
competing enterprises; 
b) stimulate bread and bakery producers by raising profitability standard as 
regards production of cheap sorts; 
c) activate a system of grain procurement from farmers and peasants using a 
mechanism of secured public grain purchases. Because of the fact that in 
March-April the peasants will need money for the spring field work, while 
the state needs grain, the following scheme could be implemented (drawing 
on experience of other countries): there is concluded a multilateral 
agreement between a state agent (National agency for material resources, 
„Moldresurse”), an insurance company, a bank and an agricultural enterprise 
or a farmer who obtain a credit on the security of grain, but remain its owner 
and can mortgage it at any moment, and sell it at a higher price. 
 
5. Taking into consideration the country’s interests, it is necessary to elaborate a food 
security programme for a mid-term (5-7 years) period, scientifically substantiated 
and practically acceptable for the state, is an urgent task, including the following 
components. 
 
a) Improvement of legislation and mechanisms regulating grain market 
relations. First of all, as the experience of other countries shows, it is 
expedient to issue a Law on Grain and Grain Market oriented at creation of 
legal, economic and institutional conditions for competitive production and 
 50
formation of a grain market that would provide for the country’s internal 
needs of bread, seed and fodder grain, as well as for its export. The main 
aspects of the law should be: subjects of the grain market; state support of 
production and processing of grain; formation and utilization of grain 
resources; control over quality of grain; grain storage; organization of grain 
purchases for the state reserve; intervention fund for prices stabilization; 
grain export-import operations. 
This law should ensure the overcoming of the negative trend of the last 
decade, when the country is mainly provided with grain at the expense of 
constant expansion of areas used for grain crops on the background of their 
decreasing yield. It is obvious that from the point of view of a long-term and 
even mid-term perspective, such an extensive approach to the sector’s 
development will not be able to ensure stable provision of the population 
with bread. 
 
b) Grain funds, their formation and utilization should be permanently 
controlled by the state. The experience of the 70-90’s shows that under 
Moldova’s conditions the optimal volume of the state grain reserve fund is 
45-50 thousand tons. In practice, over the last years it was much smaller: as 
of 1.01.2003 the state grain reserve made up 18.0 thousand tons; as of 
1.01.2004 – 16.0 thousand tons. Drawing on other countries’ experience, 
Moldova should also form an intervention grain fund to undertake state 
commodity interventions on the grain market and support stability of prices. 
Meanwhile, multiple proposals of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
Industry to create such a fund were not supported by the Ministry of Finance 
“due to lack of state budget funds for this goal”. 
 
6. The grain market development should ensure that the interests of the main subjects 
of such a market will be taken into account: grain producers, enterprises that store 
grain, purchase it for state needs and realize intervention operations, commodity 
exchanges. For the sake of stable development of the grain market it is necessary to 
take the following actions: 
a) consider expediency of formation of a state holding, with the right of the 
shareholder of state property at enterprises of the sector. The main task of the 
holding should be purchase, replenishment and renewal of state grain 
reserves. At that, there should also be elaborated a mechanism of their 
utilization – who and at what price will get “state grain”; 
b) it is necessary to conduct monitoring and certification of grain elevators, 
elaborate a proposal to issue a storage receipt – a document that would 
guarantee the safety of grain owned by specific farmers or companies. 
Storage receipts should become mortgage certificates facilitating access of 
agricultural producers to short banking credits. And it is necessary to settle 
issues related to valuation of the security with the NBM and commercial 
banks. Support in “running in” of such mechanism (as in Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan) could be rendered by the EBRD through, for example, 
establishing a specialized credit line for a start, in one of commercial banks; 
 
c) improve standards of financial service as soon as possible (monetary and 
technical credits, credit guarantees, development of commodity exchanges 
with wide utilization of futures contracts); 
 
 51
d) develop a service providing producers regularly with reliable information on 
demand, prices and supplies on internal and external markets, rules of 
concluding contracts, organizing auctions and trade fairs; 
 
e) use support prices set by the state. They are to pay off producers average 
expenditures per product unit and ensure a certain minimal profit. During the 
sale of grain at prices lower than this level the state will pay producers the 
corresponding difference; 
 
f) develop systems of storage, processing of grain on commission, create a 
territorial network for grain purchases from farmers and the population. 
 
7. It is expedient to establish a specialized credit line in one of the commercial banks 
(„Moldova-Agroindbank”? „Banca socială”?) with support of the EBRD for 
financing secured grain purchases by grain elevators with state participation. And, 
obligatory insurance of the secured grain received from peasants and enterprises 
should be guaranteed. 
 
Starting from the aspiration of the Republic of Moldova for a productive participation in 
the processes of European integration, harmonization of legislation and government 
actions in spheres related to food security of the country has to be realized as close to 
the practice of the European Union as possible. The experience of the EU accumulated 
during the process of realization of the Common Agricultural Policy is evidence of the 
necessity of a system approach to development of agricultural sector as regards goals 
and methods of their achievement through liberalization of the market, the 
corresponding tax and tariff policy, and granting subventions and compensation of 
losses.  
 
Therefore it is appropriate during elaboration and implementation of the Action Plan 
EU-Moldova 2004-2006 to improve the legal basis, forms and methods of the grain 
market development in the Republic of Moldova taking into account rules and 
procedures regulating grain market in the EU, specifically the Council Regulation (EC) 
on the Common Organization of the Market in Cereals of September 29, 2003, brought 
into effect beginning from the marketing year of 2004/2005. 
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